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Chapter 1
Introduction
History of the Pension System in Germany
Until Otto von Bismarck introduced a law concerning the old-age retirement cover-
age in Germany in 1889 people were working until their death or they were supported
by their children. Some years earlier the government introduced an accident and
a disability insurance. During this process it became aware that old people should
be prevented from life-long work and poverty as well. The implementation of an
old-age pension system went hand in hand with enormous discussions. Finally, par-
lamentarians agreed on a pension system which pension payments were related to
the agents contributions. Pension benefits were not organized in a flat way as the
aim was not to augment care against poverty1. Determination of the individual pen-
sion payments were not made according to the individual average wage income. For
simplicity reasons workers were divided into four income groups instead. Workers
received an entitlement to pension payments at the age of 70 years (in 1916 this
age was reduced to 65 years). In the period 1881/90 life expectancy at birth for
men was 37.17 and for women 40.25 years2. This makes clear that the number of
agents reaching the necessary age for retirement benefits was very low. Workers and
employers paid the same amount as contributions and the government granted a
so-called “Reichszuschuss” (governmental allowance). Although Bismarck claimed
that the state and its institution would live forever and, therefore, pensions would be
1For further information see U. Haerendel (2000).
2Data taken from G. Wiesner (2001).
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safe, the pension system was organized in a fully funded way since a pay-as-you-go
system was accepted as unreliable3.
During the first world war the capital stock of the pension system was used for
financing military activities. The hyper-inflation afterwards worsened the problem
of missing financial ressources of the system. To fulfill the public pension obliga-
tions the government switched to a PAYG system. Although the public saw those
risks of a fully funded system, the common opinion still believed in the reliability
of this scheme4. Fostered by the strong economic growth in the 1920’s, Germany
returned to a funded pension system. Under the regime of Hitler they changed some
components of the social policy. A governmental allowance to pension benefits was
no longer given on an individual level but for the general public. The amount of
allowance increased significantly. Further, a guarantee for pension benefits was no
longer given by the federal states but by the country (Reichsgarantie). At this time,
one aim was that pension benefits should not deviate to much from the wage in-
come. In contrast to the habit during the First World War, during the Second World
War it was communicated that resources of the pension system were used to finance
the acts of war. Hence, the system de facto used current contributions to fulfill its
obligations against old-age pensioners, although a PAYG system was not officially
implemented yet. In 1957 a great pension reform took place. The government intro-
duced a modified pay-as-you-go system5. This means that contribution rates were
defined, constant for a ten years coverage period, in such a way that at the end of
the period a capital stock existed which was as high as the aggregate pension obliga-
tions for one year. At that time pension payments were not an allowance to old-age
welfare instead they should more or less substitute wage income. This led to an
increase of the contribution rate from 11% to 14% in 1957 and was further increased
for the second coverage period to 16.25% and for the third to 18.25%. At the time
3Under a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system pension benefits are payed by current contributions,
hence symbolyzes a pure reallocation of wage income from the working generation to the retired
generation. Under a fully funded (FF) system agents receive the returns on their contributions as
pension benefits.
4For further information see P. Manow (2000).
5For further information see W. Schma¨hl (2007).
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of the pension reform, the government assumed a constant life-expectancy of the
agents, which had already been discussed critically by Georg Heubeck (1956) in his
survey. Through this reform, pension benefits got a dynamical component. Benefits
were no longer determined at a fixed point of time instead they were determined
continuously over the contribution period so that the development of wage income
over the work-life was respected. Over the following years mutiple changes of the
pension law occured and in 1989/92 and 2001 small reforms of the pension system
took place6. This has led to today’s effective pension law and the structure of the
pension system. Pension benefits are still payed according to the own contributions
and to the relative position of the own wage income compared to the average wage
income. Further, the pension benefits are related to the wage development of the
contributors, so that pensioners benefit from the economic development. In 2009 the
government decided that pension benefits are bounded from below, meaning that
they can only increase or remain constant but never decrease in case of a negative
wage development. For sustainability reasons a so-called sustainability factor was
introduced in 2002, which relates the number of contributors to the number of pen-
sioners. Owing the demographic change the age at entry was increased from 65 to
67 (adjustable over the next 20 years), the contribution rate raised to 19.9% and
due to the decreasing pension level the government decided to boost occupational
and private pension insurances. While the occupational pension scheme is boosted
only by taxational savings, the private pension scheme, in form of a “Riester-Rente”,
is promoted twice. The government gives allowances (if agents save the minimum
amount – 4% of the gross wage income) and tax benefits to the private scheme. Both
additional precaution instruments are not mandatory and while a high number of
agents save in form of a “Riester-Rente”, the occupational scheme is not widely
spread.
6For further informations see F. Ruland (2007).
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Overview of different European Pension Systems
In different European countries old-age retirement welfare is arranged in various
ways. A pure fully funded or a pure pay-as-you-go pension system is implemented
in none of the European countries. In general, the accommodation in retirement is
based on more than one pillar. Three pillars of old-age provisions are well-known:
a) the public pension system b) an occupational pension scheme and c) a privately
organized old-age provision. The first pillar is typically organized in form of a
PAYG system whereas the latter two are funded systems. Countries are divided in
two types: a liberal and a conservative welfare state7. Countries belonging to the
first type are for example Great Britain, Ireland, the USA and to some extend the
Netherlands. Germany, France and Austria are examples for a conservative welfare
state. Such states want to ensure the living standard of their citizens whereas a lib-
eral welfare state is anxious to prevent its citizens from old-age poverty by granting
a minimum level of pension payments. In this context two types of payment schemes
are to be mentioned: Bismarck and Beveridge. A Beveridge scheme disburses a flat
pension payment to every agent with no regard to his own contributions. This is
contrary to a Bismarck scheme where agents receive pension payments according
to their own contributions. This scheme is based on the social insurance law intro-
duced by Otto von Bismarck, which we mentioned above. The Beveridge scheme
relies on the British national insurance, which was designed mainly by Lord William
v. Beveridge. While Bismarck already introduced a social security system in 1881,
Beveridge’s ideas from 1942 led to the British social legislation in 1946. In liberal
welfare states each agent is granted a minimum pension payment, which is not suf-
ficient to ensure one’s living standard. Hence, the government of these countries
expect their citizens and companies to take measures for an appropriate welfare in
retirement. This precaution can be carried out either in the second or the third
pillar. Conservative welfare states instead intend to guarantee their citizens an ap-
propriate living standard already by the first pillar, i.e. public pension system. Due
to demographic changes it has become harder to fulfill this aim by focussing on the
first pillar only. Therefore, conservative welfare states need to enlarge their effort
7Facts provided in this paragraph are taken from H. Sto¨ger (2011).
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towards the second and third pillar. In the end, this means that agents take more
responsibility for their welfare in the retirement period. Often countries grant tax
reliefs or fringe benefits to give incentives for an appropriate prevention. The first
pillar is often encouraged by governmental grants to indemnify pension payments.
The OECD values this practice as critical since it slows down the economic growth
and contradicts the principle of fairness regarding future generations. Next, we want
to give a small overview how pension systems are structured in different countries.
Great Britain introduced the so-called Basic State Pension (BSP) in 1946, which
supplies a flat pension benefit to all agents who contributed to the system for at least
the minimal required time span. All employees are covered by this BSP. The pension
benefits are low and do not achieve the level of the British social welfare benefits.
In the 1970’s Britain introduced a mandatory public additional system (SERPS)
with the aim to ensure the living standard of agents while retired. This system was
replaced by the State Second Pension (S2P). Initially, a contribution-related pension
system, the S2P was restructured in 2007 now following the concept of Beveridge,
hence disburses flat pension payments. The British government subsidizes the sec-
ond pillar and allows to compensate the S2P system by an occupational pension
scheme. This scheme is not mandatory for companies and only 54% of all employees
are covered by such a system. The third pillar is the private pension insurance fund.
Further, a so-called Stakeholder Pension (STP) exists. This system was introduced
to cover agents who do not have an occupational or a private pension scheme and
earn between 9000 and 18500 GBP per year. Altogether the British pension system
is hardly able to guarantee its citizens their living standard.
The Netherlands implemented a pension system based on the three pillars as well.
In 1956 they introduced a contribution-financed public pension system, the so-called
Allgemene Ouderdomswet (AOW). The contribution rate was increased from 6.7%
in 1957 to 18% in 2001. Facing the problems of increased costs and a decreased
ratio of contributors to beneficiaries, the Dutch goverment established a fund in the
late 1990’s, financed by tax money, with the aim to guarantee sustainability of the
pension system. This system should not ensure living standards but prevent agents
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from old-age poverty. Pension payments are not granted according to contributions
instead according to the timespan an agent has lived in the Netherlands. To achieve
the highest possible pension payment, a citizen must live for at least 50 years in
the Netherlands. This payment is 70% of the net wage floor for singles and 50% for
couples. The second pillar consists of sectoral agreements and is part of the labor
pact. Hence, it is mandatory for companies to contribute to an occupational pension
scheme. As a result 94% of the employees are covered by such a system. The 6%
non-covered employees work for companies which are not liable to sectoral agree-
ments. One distinctive feature of the Dutch second pillar is that contributions are
payed although there might be breaks in the occupation. The third pillar, private
pension insurance, plays a minor role but is a complementary system for high-wage
earner and is promoted by taxational governmental grants.
The aim of the French pension sytem is to ensure the living standard of the citizens.
It is divided into two parts: the public pension system – regime de base – which
provides 50% of the average income and an additional mandatory occupational pen-
sion scheme. In 2003 the government raised the minimal contribution time from
37.5 to 41 years and in 2010 to 41.5 years. After the long contribution period agents
receive 50% of their average wage income. The government uses the “best 25 years”
to determine the average income. In France, families with more than three children
benefit from an income-related pension increase. Hence, large families are financially
promoted. Maternity leaves are added to the contribution period up to two years
per child. Agents whose income is very low or contribute only for a short period
to the pension system are granted with a minimal payment, the so-called minimum
vieillesse. These benefits are much lower than the minimal wage income. Agents are
differentiated in the public as well as in the occupational pension scheme by their
professional category. A big difference to Great Britain or the Netherlands is that
benefits out of the occupational pension system are not funded but instead based
on a pay-as-you-go system. Their benefits are contribution related according to a
Bismarck scheme. Private pension insurance is more or less crowded out as agents
already receive a high percentage of their net wage income by combining first and
second pillar.
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Recent Developments
Nowadays the level of pension benefits approximately lies at 70% of the last net
wage income and the contribution rate at 19.9% in Germany. Forecasts say that the
level of pension benefits will decrease while the contribution rate will increase up to
22% in 2030 (according to the “Altergrenzenanpassungsgesetz)8. There are several
reasons for this development. Demographic change is one. In many industrialized
western countries the population grows old. Real world data demonstrates a median
age of the population in several European countries and Japan above 40 years. In
Germany the median age is 44.99, in Italy it is 43.5 years. For a comparison, the
population of India has a median age of 26.2. The share of “old” agents (65 years
and older) in the entire population will increase over time in many European coun-
tries. In 1995 the share of “old” agents within the population was for example in
Germany 15.4%, in the Netherlands 13,2% and in France 15.0%. The forecast for
2050 predicts the share to be: in Germany 27.7%, in the Netherlands 24.4% and
in France 26.8%10. A time series visualizes the development of the shares of agents
under 20 years and the shares of agents above 65 years in the entire population of
Germany in a time period from 1890 to 2000. From this it becomes clear that the
share of the young population is decreasing (from 44.9% in 1890 to 21.2% in 2000)
and the share of the old population is increasing (from 5.1% in 1890 to 16.2% in
2000). The share of the working generation (age 20 to 65) increased from 50% in
1990 to 62.6% in 2000 and is supposed to stabilize around 60% in the future11. In
1871 100 agents of the working population faced 9 retirees while forcecasts guess
that in 2040 100 working agents will face 56 retirees, which is a dramatic change.
The number of retirees increased from 1960 to 2005 from 7.8 to 19.4 million in the
old West German states and if we include the newly-formed East German states to
24.5 million. The length of the retirement period increased from 9.9 years up to 17.2
8Information is taken from Ruland (2007).
9All data is taken from the World Factbook 2011 by CIA, USA and demonstrates estimated
values for 2011.
10Compare G. Wiesner (2001).
11Data taken from the Statistisches Bundesamt in G. Wiesner (2001).
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years.
All these numbers visualize that future solvency of the implemented public pension
system in Germany is disputable. It is not clear whether a PAYG system will be able
to support retirees with suitable pension benefits. Therefore, it is often discussed
to switch to a fully funded pension system. Such a system is independent of the
demographic development, of the unemployment rate and of the economic progress.
Also it is often claimed that an FF system earns higher returns for its retirees than
a PAYG system. If an FF system is implemented, agents have to take more respon-
sibility to ensure themselves a sufficient old-age wealth. Many papers claim that
an FF system leads to higher economic growth due to higher capital accumulation
but often neglect the effects on the wage rate and the interest rate. Nevertheless,
these two values have a big impact on the welfare of agents. Before a switch of the
systems is implemented it should be clearified whether a PAYG or an FF system
leads to higher welfare. This work tries to shed light on the comparison of these two
different pension systems in their pure form (no tax benefits or any allowances).
The effects of different pension systems on the economy are manifold. Pension
systems do not only influence economic growth through higher or lower physical
capital accumulation but have an impact on agents’ decisions for children and on
investments in education of children. This again are factors which favor economic
growth. Hence, an analysis which compares pension systems but disregards the
impact on individual decisions besides savings neglects an important aspect. The
relation between economic growth and individual welfare (measured in individual
life-time utility) is ambiguous. In some economic situations it may be possible to
draw conclusions directly from this stylized fact but this is not necessarily the case.
Also, it might be that one pension system leads to higher inequality (regarding hu-
man capital, i.e. wage income) within the economy. Beside the political implication
(instability of political formations, riots, etc.) it is not clear whether this prohibits
higher welfare. Although the inequality is higher under one system, it might be that
the agent’s welfare is superior if each agent earns higher wage income under this
system.
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The main questions, which we try to answer in this work, are:
• Does higher economic growth go hand in hand with higher individual welfare?
• Do different pension systems have diverse impact on the fertility rate?
• Is the decision on investments in education of children influenced by different
pension systems in various ways?
• Can the fertility of agents be increased by transfer payments? And does this
lead to higher economic growth?
• Which system leads to higher inequality? Is this necessarily welfare lowering?
While the second chapter mainly addresses the first question, chapters 3 and 4 con-
sider various additional questions. Chapter 2 uses a closed economy and elaborates
the crucial relation between the state of development of (various) economies, growth
and welfare. It incorporates effects of physical capital accumulation on the rate of
return which may reduce welfare. The last two chapters employ a small open econ-
omy to focus on additional questions like fertility (chapter 3) and education (chapter
4) without the effects on wage and interest rates.
In all three following chapters we use an OLG-Model. This allows us to analyze
intertemporal effects and dynamic processes over time. We consider closed as well
as small open economies. Although the small open economy assumption is a strict
simplification, it offers the possibility of clear statements on the regarded effects
of the pension systems. All agents face a certain non stochastic lifespan, i.e. we
abstract from the risks of an early demise.
Model Overview
In the second chapter we analyze economic growth and individual welfare (measured
as life-time utility) and show that higher economic growth does not necessarily lead
to higher individual welfare. Using the structure of a two-period OLG-Model we
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present a general equilibrium model of a closed economy populated by homogenous
agents. Decisions on education and the number of children are neglected. To ac-
comodate the demographic change, observable in many developed economies, we
implement a stochastic process for the development of the population size. In our
model the population is shrinking over time. Although agents do not make decisions
regarding their schooling, we implement an exogenously given human capital forma-
tion process in which human capital is growing by a constant factor over time. Our
model coincides with the common result that FF leads to higher physical capital
accumulation and, therefore, to higher economic growth. Testing whether higher
economic growth goes hand in hand with higher welfare, we find that there is not
necessarily a positive link. We show that different economies, endowed with different
capital intensity factors, do not all benefit (in terms of welfare) from the same pen-
sion system. This means that the pension system, which leads in a highly developed
economy to higher welfare, may result in lower welfare in a non-developed economy.
A statement on higher welfare under one pension system can, therefore, not be given
without knowing the capital intensity factor of the economy. The model considered
here concentrates on a comparison of pension systems implemented in two identical
economies at the same time. Therefore, we neglect the transition from one system
to the other.
The third chapter considers the impact of pension systems and payment schemes on
the welfare of heterogenous agents, measured in terms of individual life-time utility.
One result is that PAYG as well as FF can be the pension system that ensures the
higher possible welfare depending on economic parameters. The two major pension
systems are considered, each in combination with two different payment schemes:
Beveridge (flat) and Bismarck (contribution related). Heterogeneity of agents is one
additional aspect which distinguishes our work from many other papers which often
assume homogeneity of agents. For simplicity, we introduce two different types of
agents: low-skilled (low individual human capital) and high-skilled (high individual
human capital). The agents differ according to their human capital endowment,
but are equipped with the same preferences. Depending on their individual types
agents prefer different payment schemes regarding their individual welfare. Their
10
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birth rates also differ under different schemes. High-skilled agents will have at most
the same number of children as the low-skilled agents under all four possible com-
binations of pension systems and payment schemes. Excluding a learning process,
this leads to a decrease of average human capital over time. As this results in a
lowering of output per capita, which is often used as a measurement of welfare, we
ask whether incentives can be introduced to raise fertility of high-skilled agents. By
introducing transfer payments it is possible to raise fertility and through this to in-
crease average human capital. As these incentives work in the intended direction we
further analyze whether additional advantages like an increase of individuals welfare
go hand in hand.
The fourth chapter presents an equilibrium model of a small open economy with
inter-generational altruism. In a benchmark model we analyze how different pension
systems influence the human capital formation of agents. Agents decide whether and
how much (we exclude credit constraints) to invest in the education process of their
children. The aim is to show that agents behave differently (concerning education
expenditures) under the two different pension systems. Further, a PAYG pension
system leads to higher human capital formation and higher economic output than
an FF system under certain conditions. We try to figure out whether this is valid
in general or whether certain conditions exist under which a PAYG system leads
to higher economic growth. As this model uses a small open economy with mobile
physical capital and immobile human capital, the only source for economic growth
is aggregate human capital. We introduce two different families of agents who are
homogenous within the family but heterogenous concerning their human capital
endowment between the families. Regarding their preferences and their ability pa-
rameter the agents of the two families do not differ. The influence of the pension
systems is different on the two families. It is shown that the family which is ini-
tially wealthier (higher human capital leads to higher wage income) will remain the
wealthier family over time. We analyze under which pension system the inequality
concerning the allocation of human capital within a generation is larger and whether
higher economic output goes hand in hand with higher inequality or not. The model
shows that under certain conditions a positive link between inequality and economic
11
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output exists. In contrast, Galor and Zeira (1993) show that higher inequality goes
hand in hand with lower economic output. The main difference to our work is the
existence of imperfect credit markets and the existence of two different production
functions which either employ unskilled or skilled labor. Our work does not compare
the economy under the two different pension systems in a steady state analysis but
pointwise in each period.
Small Literature Overview
In a closed economy without pension systems Fanti and Gori (2007) and (2010)
analyze the effects of child allowance on endogenous fertility. They claim in both
papers that child benefits have an ambiguous effect on the fertility rate since op-
posing effects exist. They figure out a direct positive effect due to reduced costs of
child-rearing but as well a negative effect due to the reduced wage rate. In their
paper from 2010 they add schooling expenditures which are financed by all agents in
the economy. While child grants are constant over time, expenditures on schooling
may vary over time. One result is that an increase of schooling expenditures leads
to higher fertility and to higher economic growth. Although we use a small open
economy, we see the positive effect of increased human capital on economic growth
and as well welfare in chapter 3 and 4.
In the paper by Fenge and Weizsa¨cker (2009) agents divide their time to work and to
have children, assuming that each child reduces the labor time by a certain fraction.
Implementing a PAYG pension system, the costs of having children remain private
while the benefits become public. They introduce a twofold pension system con-
sisting of a Bismarck pension – benefits are payed proportionally to contributions
– and a child pension – benefits according to the number of own children. While a
Bismarck pension helps to minimize the labor-leisure (child time) distortion of the
PAYG system, a child pension minimizes the fertility distortion. They figure out
that child pensions and child benefits (in our work: transfer payments) are perfect
substitutes.
Wigger (1999) assumes intergenerational care, meaning that old retired agents re-
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ceive pension payments and presents from their children. Hence, having children is
kind of an insurance of future wealth. Presents depend negatively on the contribu-
tion rates as higher contributions imply higher pension benefits. One of his results
is that higher contribution rates lead to lower fertility rates since agents know that
children make less presents and, therefore, lose their significance as an insurance of
old-age wealth.
Soares (2006) as well as Lambrecht et al (2005) explore implications of a learning
process on economic growth under PAYG pension systems. Due to altruism as well
as egoism (higher pensions) parents finance the learning process of their children
and, therefore, improve their human capital which leads to higher economic growth
and to higher pension payments.
Kaganovich and Zilcha (2012) present a general equilibrium model in which they
implement a human capital formation rule. Public education expenditures are de-
termined by a majoritarian vote. They show that an FF pension leads to higher tax
rates for education expenditures than a PAYG system and through this to higher hu-
man and physical capital accumulation and to higher economic growth. Kaganovich
and Meier (forthcoming) show that the opposite is true in a small open economy.
The fourth chapter of this work is similar to those two papers. While using a small
open economy we draw our attention to private investments in schooling of children
instead of publicly determined education expenditures. Our model uses private
schooling as an additional optional part in the human capital formation. It shows
that parents invest in education if their preferences for childrens’ human capital are
strong enough, i.e. if the intergenerational altruism is strong enough.
Glomm and Kaganovich (2008) implement a model of heterogenous agents in which
the government funds two programs: public education and social security. Agents
contribute a proportional tax to both programs while the benefits which they re-
ceive are flat. Parental time and public schooling expenditures are complementary
goods in the human capital formation. They show that an increase of the social
security tax rate has a reducing effect on the income inequality and on the same
time a positive effect on the economic growth. A comparison of the effects under
FF and PAYG pension systems is neglected. Differences to our results in chapter
4 can be explained by different human capital formations and the assumption of a
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closed economy.
Galor and Zeira (1993) analyze the relation between inequality and growth as well
but without the existence of any pension system. One result of their work is that
higher inequality goes hand in hand with lower economic output. The main dif-
ference to our results in chapter 4 arises through the existence of imperfect credit
markets and the existence of two different production functions which either employ
unskilled or skilled labor.
Why is a Switch of Pension Systems so difficult?
The difficulty of a transition from a PAYG pension system to an FF one lies in
the fact that agents who have already contributed during their whole work-life to
the PAYG pension system will not receive any pension payments out of the new
implemented FF system. The switch of the pension systems is a clear cut. So far,
retirees received pension payments out of the contributions from working agents.
After the transition their pension payments will be the return on their own con-
tributions. Therefore, agents, who contributed only to the PAYG system, do not
receive anything out of the FF system. Of course, it is a huge social problem how
to compensate the generations who contributed (partly) to the PAYG system and
face no (or low) public pension payments after the switch. A compensation must
assure that these generations are not worse off after the transition.
As a PAYG system is just a pure reallocation of wage-income from the working
population to the retired population, there are no financial reserves, which could be
used for compensating the transition generation. A switch from one system to the
other always includes a structural break and it is not reasonable that this can be
done without lowering the welfare of at least some generations. There are two pos-
sible szenarios for financing a compensation of the transition generation supposably.
The first would be to tax agents by a higher rate until the transition period. The
government would save/invest these tax revenue and would finance the compensa-
tion payments out of the returns in the crucial period. This would lead to a lowering
of the welfare of all agents who would face the higher tax burden. The advantage
of this szenario is that after the transition no additional payments are necessary
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and only a pure FF pension system exists. The second possibility would be that
the government pays the compensation payments financed by a debt and increases
the tax rate after the transition for some generations. The compensation payments
would have to be high enough so that the transition generation would receive the
same welfare as if a PAYG pension system would still be implemented. The tax rate
would have to be adjusted in such a way that the generations facing the higher tax
burden would not be worse off compared to the case of a PAYG system. This could
be achieved if an FF pension system led to higher welfare in general. Then it is pos-
sible to compensate the transition generation without setting any generation worse
off in terms of life-time utility. In 2000/2001 the German government introduced
the so-called “Riester-Rente”. This is a privately financed pension system with the
structure of an FF system. Under certain conditions (minimal contributions – 4%
of the net wage income) the government advances contributions to this private pen-
sion system by granting fringe benefits and tax reliefs. The German government
introduced this kind of private pension system because the net-pension-standard
was reduced from 70% to 67% during the pension-reform. Since 2005 the German
goverment has advanced the “Ru¨rup-Rente” by granting tax benefits as well.
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Chapter 2
Pension Systems and their
Meaning for Welfare
Abstract: The implementation of a fully funded (FF) pension system in an econ-
omy leads to higher economic growth than the implementation of a pay-as-you-go
(PAYG) system. But it is not clear how pension systems influence the utility of
the population through their effect on wage-rates and rates of return on capital.
This chapter shows that PAYG leads to higher welfare under specific conditions.
Economies, which vary in their capital intensity factors, generate higher welfare of
their agents under different pension systems. Using a closed economy with stochastic
population growth we present a general equilibrium model and analyze the relation
between economic growth and individual agents’ welfare.
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2.1 Introduction
As the population of most industrialized countries becomes older and older over
time, the question of how to ensure their old-age wealth becomes more important.
In these countries we observe a demographic change and the old generation will
become the dominant fraction of the population. Real world data demonstrates a
median age of the population in several European countries and in Japan above
40 years of age. In Germany the median age is 44.91, in Italy it is 43.5 years for
instance. For a comparison, the population of India has a median age of 26.2. The
World Factbook 2011 provides time series which indicate that the population in
many countries grows old. This may be due to better health care, healthier ways
of life, less hard work and many more. In most European countries, except the
Netherlands, the old-age security system is organized in the form of a pay-as-you-go
(PAYG) pension system. In this case, the young working part of the population
pays for the pension payments of the old and retired part of the population. Hence
a PAYG system is a pure reallocation of income from young working agents to old
retired agents. As the fraction of young working individuals is shrinking, they have
to contribute indivually more from their wage income or the retirees will receive
a lower pension payment by constant contribution rates. Due to the demographic
change, doubts arise whether a PAYG pension system will remain sustainable. Of-
ten discussed is a transition from PAYG to a fully funded (FF) pension system to
solve the problem of less contributors and more beneficiaries. The PAYG system is
not suited to provide an adequate level of retirement payment at acceptable costs
for the contributors. Some observers think that the existing pension system has to
be changed in a drastic way as they see it already on the “verge to collapse” Bo¨rsch-
Supan (1998). The health of the pension system is of major interest, as Diamond,
Orzag (2005) exposed for the USA that for two-thirds of the elderly beneficiaries the
pension payment is the majority of income and for 20 percent of the beneficiaries it
is their only income.
1All data is taken from the World Factbook 2011 by CIA, USA and demonstrates estimated
values for 2011
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Before taking the difficult task of a transition from a PAYG pension system to an FF
one, it should be clear whether an FF system is the favorable option. One aspect is
economic growth under both pension systems, which is considered by many papers
in the existing literature. A different aspect is individual welfare. In this paper we
analyze both and show that higher economic growth does not necessarily lead to
higher individual welfare, which is scaled as life-time utility. Using the structure of
a two-period OLG-Model we present a general equilibrium model in which we use
a closed economy populated by homogeneous agents. Decisions on education and
the number of children are neglected. To accomodate the demographic change we
implement a stochastic process for the development of the population size. In our
model the population is shrinking over time. Although agents do not make decisions
regarding their schooling, we implement an exogenously given human capital forma-
tion process in which human capital is growing by a constant factor over time. Our
model coincides with the common result that FF leads to higher physical capital
accumulation and, therefore, to higher economic growth. Analyzing whether higher
economic growth goes hand in hand with higher welfare shows not necessarily a
positive correlation. Different economies, endowed with different capital intensity
factors, do not all benefit (in terms of welfare) from the same pension system. This
means, that the pension system which leads in a highly developed economy to higher
welfare, may result in lower welfare in a non-developed economy. A statement on
the dominance of one pension system can, therefore, not be given without knowing
the capital intensity factor of the economy. Our considerations focus on a compar-
ison of pension systems implemented in two identical economies at the same time.
Therefore, we neglect the transition from one system to the other.
2.2 The basic model
We consider an overlapping generations economy in which perfectly competitive
firms produce a homogeneous good, which can be used for consumption and for
investment. They use physical and human capital as inputs in a constant returns
neoclassical production technology F (K,H). As we assume a closed economy, phys-
ical and human capital are immobile and remain within the economy. The popula-
18
2. Growth and Welfare
tion lives for exactly two periods – adulthood and retirement – and each generation
consists of a number of homogeneous agents, who are all endowed with a certain
amount of human capital. As we want to study the effects of demographic change
and human capital, the size of each generation does not remain constant over time,
hence we assume population growth.
The production technology can be described by a classical Cobb-Douglas production
function:
Yt = F (Kt, Ht) = AK
δ
t H
1−δ
t = AK
δ
t (Nt ht)
1−δ (2.2.1)
with A > 0, 0 < δ < 1. Yt describes total output in period t, Kt is the aggregate stock
of physical capital financed by the savings of the previous generation (depending on
the type of pension system). Ht denotes the aggregate stock of human capital. All
agents supply inelastically one unit of labor in their first period of life. The aggregate
stock of human capital Ht = Ntht used for production is given by the number of
young/adult agents (Nt) times their individual endowment of human capital (ht).
The aggregate stock of physical capital is determined in different ways under the
two types of pension systems. Capital is assumed to depreciate completely from
one period to the next. Hence aggregate capital never contains old capital. In case
of a PAYG pension system the aggregate capital in t + 1 consists of the aggregate
savings st of the young agents in period t. Therefore,
KGt+1 = Nt s
G
t . (2.2.2)
Variables belonging to the PAYG system are indexed by G, variables belonging to
the fully funded system by F .
The characteristic of a fully funded pension system is that the contributions are
invested/saved in the production process and are not only reallocated from young
to old agents like under a PAYG system. Hence, aggregate capital consists of private
savings and public savings (from the pension system):
KFt+1 = Nt s
F
t +Nt τ w
F
t ht, (2.2.3)
where τ denotes the contribution rate. Since the FF pension system is assumed to
withold no part of the contributions to cover any costs or to gain proceeds, aggregate
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contributions are completly invested. Factor markets are competitive so that prices
of physical and human capital are given by their marginal products:
wt =
∂F (Kt, Ht)
∂Ht
= (1− δ)AKδtH−δt = (1− δ)Akδt (2.2.4)
Rt+1 =
∂F (Kt+1, Ht+1)
∂Kt+1
= δ AKδ−1t+1 H
1−δ
t+1 = δ A k
δ−1
t+1 (2.2.5)
where kt =
Kt
Nt ht
denotes capital in efficiency units. The homogeneous agents live
exactly for two periods, i.e. there is no risk of an early demise. In their first period
of life, i.e. adulthood, they inelastically supply one unit of labor. In the second
period they are retired and do not work, therefore, gain no wage income. Each
member of a generation t, adult in period t, is endowed with identical individual
human capital denoted by ht. We assume that the individual human capital grows
by an exogenously given factor from one generation to the next. The human capital
formation is described by:
ht+1 = β ht (2.2.6)
where β > 1 denotes the exogenously given growth factor of human capital. It
directly follows that a generation t+ 1 is more skilled than its preceding generation
t. Hence, the quality of labor, offered by the young agents, is higher than the one
of their ancestors. If the population size would remain constant over time, it would
result in a continuosly growing aggregate stock of human capital. As the population
does not remain constant over time but instead decreases, it is not clear whether
the aggregate stock of human capital is increasing, decreasing or remains constant
over time. The population is growing with a stochastic growth factor, denoted by
nt+1. The size of the population is given by:
Nt+1 = (1 + nt+1)Nt. (2.2.7)
nt+1 is i.i.d. and uniformly distributed over an intervall [a, b] for all t, with a < b.
If we want to simulate a decreasing population (demographic change in the western
industry economies), at least the parameter a has to be negative and its absolute
value has to be greater than that of b. The size of the future generation Nt+1 is not
known by the generation t in period t.
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2.3 Individual decisions
In this section our focus lies on the single agent and his decisions regarding savings
and consumption. Since he lives for exactly two periods but receives wage income
(which can be consumed or invested) only in the first period, he has to ensure
consumption in both periods via savings and/or pension payments. As his wage
income is non-storable (for later consumption), he invests part of it in the production
process. In the second period of his life he receives returns on his investment and
pension payments, which he consumes completly as we do not assume any bequest
motives.
2.3.1 Decisions under PAYG
The PAYG pension system is the predominant system in most industrialized coun-
tries. It is characterized by a reallocation of wage income. Young working agents
are forced by the government to contribute a fixed part of their wage income (con-
tributions) to the pension system. The PAYG system takes these contributions but
does not invest them in the production process. Instead it gives it directly to the
living old-age retirees (beneficiaries).
The agents receive utility out of consumption in both periods. As they have to make
their decision regarding today’s and tomorrow’s consumption (e.g. savings) at the
beginning of their first period, we describe their expected utility by the following
equation:
Et
[
UG(ct,t, ct+1,t)
]
= ln cGt,t + Et[ln cGt+1,t] (2.3.1)
where ct,t denotes consumption in period t of an agent born/adult in t and ct+1,t is his
consumption in t+ 1. As consumption in adulthood depends on common variables
only, it is not necessary to regard the expected value of today’s consumption. The
resulting utility out of future consumption is uncertain in period t because of the
uncertain development of the population. All variables of period t + 1 are random
at the point of time t. The young working agents allocate their after-tax (after
contribution) wage income W1 between current consumption and private savings.
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Hence they face the following budget constraint in their first period:
cGt,t = W
G
1 − sGt (2.3.2)
= (1− τ)wGt ht − sGt
where wt is the current competitive wage rate per unit of effective labor. Effective
labor means labor multiplied by the individual human capital which symbolizes how
productive one unit of labor is. τ is the uniform and flat contribution rate, which
agents take as given. Their decision regarding private savings is not limited to pos-
itive values. That means, they are allowed to borrow against their future wealth.
The interest rate is assumed to be the same for borrowing as well as for lending.
Negative savings are equal to credit taking and can be caused by appreciating to-
day’s consumption more than tomorrows. Each agent of the same generation is
supposed to receive an equal amount of benefits from the pension system while re-
tired. These benefits as well as returns on private savings are no objects of taxation.
The total amount of contributions from the new working generation is collected by
the pension system and passed to the old generation without any deductions for
administration costs. Our agents are assumed to be self-concerned and only value
their own consumption, i.e. there are no bequest motives. Therefore, we write the
individual budget constraint of an old-age retiree in the following way (which is
random at the point of time t)
cGt+1,t = R
G
t+1 st +W
G
2 (2.3.3)
= RGt+1 s
G
t +
Nt+1
Nt
τ wGt+1 ht+1
= RGt+1 s
G
t + (1 + nt+1) τ w
G
t+1 β ht,
where WG2 are the benefits an old-age retiree receives from the pension system. The
gross rate of return on savings is given by RGt+1s
G
t . w
G
t+1 denotes the wage rate of
the future generation (born in t + 1) and ht+1 is future individual human capital.
Each agent derives his decision belonging to his decision variables sGt , c
G
t,t, c
G
t+1,t by
maximizing his expected utility of life-time consumption given in (2.3.1) with respect
to the budget constraints given by (2.3.2) and (2.3.3).
max
st,ct,t,ct+1,t
Et
[
UG(ct,t, ct+1,t)
]
= max
st,ct,t,ct+1,t
ln cGt,t + Et[ln cGt+1,t]. (2.3.4)
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Solving the system we obtain from the FOC2:
sGt =
1− τ
2 + τ (1− δ) δ−1 w
G
t ht. (2.3.5)
Due to the logarithmic form of the utility function, the demography factor nt+1 is
cancelled out and, therefore, the insecurity belonging to the benefit payments from
the yet unknown group of contribution payers plays no role in the decision process.
If we substitute optimal savings, given by (2.3.5), in equation (2.3.2), we receive
consumption in adulthood as:
cGt,t =
1 + τ (1− δ) δ−1
2 + τ (1− δ) δ−1 (1− τ)w
G
t ht (2.3.6)
=
1 + τ (1− δ) δ−1
2 + τ (1− δ) δ−1 (1− τ) (1− δ)A (k
G
t )
δ ht.
By plugging (2.3.5) in equation (2.3.3) and then applying formula (2.2.5), we receive
consumption in the second period of life as
cGt+1,t = R
G
t+1
1− τ
2 + τ (1− δ) δ−1 w
G
t ht + (1 + nt+1) τ w
G
t+1 ht+1 (2.3.7)
= δA(kGt+1)
δ−1 1− τ
2 + τ(1− δ)δ−1w
G
t ht + (1 + nt+1)τ(1− δ)A(kGt+1)δht+1.
Knowing (2.3.5), we now determine the aggregate stock of capital under a PAYG
regime, which is given by the aggregate savings of the previous generation:
KGt+1 = Nt
1− τ
2 + τ (1− δ) δ−1 w
G
t ht (2.3.8)
kGt+1 =
1
1 + nt+1
(1− τ) (1− δ)
β(2 + τ (1− δ) δ−1) A (k
G
t )
δ. (2.3.9)
The determination of KGt+1 and k
G
t+1 uses a Markovian process. Hence, by knowing
today’s variables wGt , ht, Nt, k
G
t we can determine tomorrow’s capital stock. This
relationship shows that tomorrow’s aggregate stock of capital, used in the production
technology, is uniquely determined. Using this expression for capital in efficiency
2To receive st in this form, we use the equality k˜
G
t+1 =
Nt s
G
t
(1+n˜t+1)Nt β ht
which is the capital in
efficiency units in period t+ 1. kt+1 is a random variable in period t
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units in equation (2.3.7), we calculate tomorrow’s consumption by
cGt+1,t =
(
1
1 + nt+1
)δ−1(
(1− τ)(1− δ)
2 + τ(1− δ)δ−1
)δ
htA
δ+1β1−δδ
(
1 + τ(1− δ)δ−1) (kGt )δ2.
(2.3.10)
Later we will compare the expected life-time utility of an agent under PAYG and
under FF. It is more interesting to compare utilities in the long-run instead of
directly after introducing the appropriate pension system, as it is possible to achieve
fluctuations of outcome through the introduction process. These fluctuations are
supposed to be cancelled out in the long run. Hence we need a conditional equation
which determines the capital in efficiency units for an arbitrary period t. The law
of motion of kGt is given by
kGt =
1
1 + nt
(
1
1 + nt−1
)δ
. . .
(
1
1 + n1
)δt−1(
(1− δ)(1− τ)
β(2 + τ (1− δ) δ−1) A
)∑t
i=1 δ
i−1
kδ
t
0 .
(2.3.11)
Initial capital in efficiency units is given by k0 =
K0
H0
. We assume that the initial
endowment of physical and human capital and the initial size of the population is
the same under both pensions systems, hence we drop the superscript G in equation
(2.3.11). In the case of a fixed demographic factor n the prefactor would be simplified
to
(
1
1+n
)∑t
i=1 δ
i−1
.
2.3.2 Decisions under Fully Funded
There is a significant dissimilarity in the way the two different types of pension sys-
tems work. While the PAYG systems collects contributions from the young agents
and transmits them directly to the retirees, the FF system collects the contributions,
but then saves them for one period. The savings of the FF pension system are in-
vested in the production technology and earn a return. The single agent is equipped
with the same logarithmic and additively separable utility function as under the
PAYG system. But as the FF systems works in a varied way, the pension benefit
payments are defined differently. So the individual budget constraints differ:
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cFt,t = (1− τ)wFt ht − sFt (2.3.12)
cFt+1,t = R
F
t+1 s
F
t +W
F
2
= RFt+1 s
F
t +R
F
t+1τ w
F
t ht (2.3.13)
Equation (2.3.13) demonstrates the significant difference between FF and PAYG.
Under a PAYG system the pension benefits depend on the wage income of the
succeeding generation. In contrast, now they depend only on current wage income
and on the rate of return on savings. In the literature it is often claimed that
the aggregate stock of capital is higher under FF than under PAYG. We will later
examine the validity of this statement. The decision problem is expressed by
max
st,ct,t,ct+1,t
Et[UF (ct,t, ct+1,t)] = max
st,ct,t,ct+1,t
ln cFt,t + Et[ln cFt+1,t] (2.3.14)
From the FOC we receive:
sFt =
1
2
(wFt ht − 2 τ wFt ht) =
1− 2τ
2
wFt ht (2.3.15)
which will be negative (credit taking) for contribution rates being higher than 50
percent. Due to the logarithmic form of the utility function the rate of return is
cancelled out, so that optimal savings do not depend on the stochastic population
growth factor. The savings decision is non-random and depends only on well-known
variables. Substituting (2.3.15) in equation (2.3.12) yields the current consumption
in period t
cFt,t = (1− τ)wFt ht −
1
2
(wFt ht − 2 τ wFt ht) =
1
2
wFt ht
=
1
2
(1− δ)A (kFt )δ ht. (2.3.16)
By plugging (2.3.15) into (2.3.13) and applying (2.2.5), consumption in the second
period is given by
cFt+1,t = Rt+1 (
1
2
wFt ht)
= δ A2 (kFt+1)
δ−1 1
2
(1− δ) (kFt )δ ht. (2.3.17)
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Hence, the expected life-time utility under FF is independent of the contribution
rate τ . This is due to the fact that private savings by agents and investments in
the FF pension system are perfect substitutes since the system as well as the agents
invest in the same production process. After determining optimal savings in (2.3.15)
and knowing that all agents are homogeneous we can determine the aggregate stock
of physical capital by using equation (2.2.3)
KFt+1 = Nt
1− 2τ
2
wFt ht +Nt τ w
F
t ht
=
1
2
Nt (1− δ)A (kFt )δ ht. (2.3.18)
The future capital in efficiency units can be written as
kFt+1 =
KFt+1
Nt+1 ht+1
=
1
1 + nt+1
1− δ
2 β
A (kFt )
δ. (2.3.19)
The size of the population is independent of the selected type of pension system,
hence, we drop any superscript belonging to the development of the population.
Using (2.3.19) for the determination of the future consumption in equation (2.3.17)
we receive
cFt+1,t = (1 + nt+1)
1−δ Aδ+1 β1−δ
(
1− δ
2
)δ
δ ht (k
F
t )
δ2 . (2.3.20)
As we want to express capital in efficiency units in any period t > 0 as a function of
the initial parameters δ, τ, β and k0 and the realized values of the stochastic variable
nt+1, we receive the following law of motion:
kFt =
1
1 + nt
(
1
1 + nt−1
)δ
. . .
(
1
1 + n1
)δt−1 (
1− δ
2 β
A
)∑t
i=1 δ
i−1
kδ
t
0 . (2.3.21)
2.3.3 Determination of τ - social planner
In this section we will analyze the contribution rate which is chosen by a social
planner. The previous section shows that the contribution rate has a direct effect
on the optimal savings under a PAYG regime. So it is clear that τ also has an
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influence on expected utility. Under an FF regime τ does not have any impact
neither on the optimal savings nor on the current and future consumption. This
leads to the conclusion that τ has no impact on the expected life-time utility of an
agent. We will indeed proof this later.
As all agents in our economy are homogeneous, the optimal contribution rate will
be the same for every agent.
Contributions under PAYG
The contribution rate τ lies in the interval [0, 1]. Contribution rates smaller than
0 are not compatible with the principle of a pension system as this would mean
that young agents borrow from their parents. This is not allowed since they cannot
repay they debt in the next period as the parents are not alive anymore. Agents
are allowed to borrow against their future wealth by choosing a negative savings
amount, but not by choosing a negative contribution rate. A rate higher than 1 is
also not possible as the agents do not have any initial endowment out of which they
could pay the contribution. Hence, the complete amount of their wage income is
the maximal contribution to the pension system.
The social planner maximizes the expected life-time utility of all agents with regard
to their optimal savings decision. With d := τ (1 − δ) δ−1 the objective function is
given by:
max
τ
Et[UG(·, ·)] = max
τ
ln
(
1 + d
2 + d
(1− τ) (1− δ)A(kGt )δ ht
)
+ Et
[
ln
((
1
1 + nt+1
)δ−1(
(1− τ) (1− δ)
β (2 + d)
)δ
htA
δ+1 β1−δ δ (1 + d) (kGt )
δ2
)]
= ln
(
1 + d
2 + d
(1− τ) (1− δ)A(kGt )δht
)
+ ln
((
(1− τ) (1− δ)
β (2 + d)
)δ
htA
δ+1 β1−δ δ (1 + d) (kGt )
δ2
)
+ Et
[
ln
(
1
1 + nt+1
)δ−1]
.
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From the FOC we receive two values for the optimal contribution rate τ .
τ1(δ) =
1
4
δ2 + 2 δ − 1
4
− 1
4
√
δ4 + 8δ3 + 14δ2 + 8δ + 1
δ − 1 (2.3.22)
τ2(δ) =
1
4
δ2 + 2 δ − 1
4
+ 1
4
√
δ4 + 8δ3 + 14δ2 + 8δ + 1
δ − 1 (2.3.23)
The latter is always negative for all possible values of δ and, therefore, is economically
non reasonable. The first τ−value approves positive values for a meaningful interval
of δ−values.
Proposition 2.3.1. The contribution rate, chosen by a social planner, is unique
and well-defined for given δ . It is given by3:
τ ∗(δ) =

1
4
δ2+2 δ− 1
4
− 1
4
√
δ4+8δ3+14δ2+8δ+1
δ−1 if δ ∈ [0, δˆ] = [0, 2
√
3− 3]
0 else
This means that a PAYG pension system is only operating if the capital intensity
factor δ takes values in an appropriate interval δ ∈ [0, 2√3 − 3]. Otherwise the
optimal contribution rate is zero. If the capital intensity is too high, a negative
contribution rate will result. This would mean that the retired agents have to hand
over commodities to the young generation. As this would contradict the function
of a pension system, the contribution rate is limited from below by zero. A zero
contribution rate would mean that de facto no pension system exists, hence an
economy without a pension system is optimal.
Contributions under FF
As previously claimed, the decision variables of an agent do not depend on the
contribution rate τ under an FF pension system. The objective function of the
social planner with respect to the agents’ optimal savings decision is given by
max
τ
Et[UF (·, ·)]=max
τ
ln
(
1
2
(1− δ)A(kFt )δht
)
+ Et
[
ln
(
Aδ+1β1−δ
(
1− δ
2
)δ
δ ht(k
F
t )
δ2
)]
=ln
(
1
2
(1− δ)A(kFt )δht
)
+ ln
(
Aδ+1β1−δ
(
1− δ
2
)δ
δht(k
F
t )
δ2
)
+ Et
[
(1 + nt+1)
1−δ] .
3For a proof see the Appendix.
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Hence, the social planner can choose any contribution rate τ ∈ [0, 1] and it will be
optimal. The reason for this is that private savings and contributions to the fully
funded pension system are perfect substitutes.
2.4 Comparison of the capital in efficiency units
In this section we analyze the development of the physical capital stock (in efficiency
units) under the two different pension regimes. The height of the physical capital
stock is decisive for the economy’s economic perfomance, even more in case of a high
capital intensity factor δ. Capital growth stimulates the expansion of the produc-
tion output, but, nevertheless, it is not clear whether the life-time utility of an agent
grows as well. In the first step we will check whether clear statements concerning
the comparison of the capital under both systems are possible. The next step will
be to prove whether one pension system allows higher growth rates of the capital
over time than the other.
Human capital formation and population growth are independent of the pension
regime in this model. This means, human capital as well as population size are the
same under both systems in all periods t ≥ 0. This is even more important for
the stochastic demography factor nt. We assume its realizations to be the same,
no matter which system is introduced. If a clear statement about the proportion
of the capital in efficiency units is possible, the same would be true for the ranking
of the aggregate stock of capital and the production output under both pension
systems. In most papers, for example Kaganovich and Zilcha (2012), it is claimed
that under the FF system a higher aggregate stock of physical capital is received.
Define pi(n) := 1
1+nt
(
1
1+nt−1
)δ
. . .
(
1
1+n1
)δt−1
where n := (n1, n2, · · · , nt−1, nt) is a
vector of all realized population growth rates up to period t. A comparison of the
capital in efficiency units yields the following equivalence relation:
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kGt < k
F
t
⇐⇒ pi(n)
(
(1− δ) (1− τ)
β(2 + τ (1− δ) δ−1) A
)∑t
i=1 δ
i−1
kδ
t
0 < pi(n)
(
1− δ
2 β
A
)∑t
i=1 δ
i−1
kδ
t
0
⇐⇒ (1− δ) (1− τ)
β(2 + τ (1− δ) δ−1) <
1− δ
2 β
⇐⇒ 1− τ
2 + τ (1− δ) δ−1 <
1
2
(2.4.1)
The last inequality is true for all τ, δ ∈ (0, 1). From this follows that the capital in
efficiency units is always higher under an FF than under a PAYG pension system.
This holds true for any arbitrary period t: kGt < k
F
t ∀ t ≥ 1. Hence, the production
level is higher under FF than under PAYG. This goes hand in hand with a higher
wage income for the agents. The fact that physical capital is always higher under FF
than under PAYG in any period t does not necessary mean that the proportion of
the growth rates of capital behave in the same way. It could be that the growth rate
is higher under PAYG and hence the two aggregate stocks of capital approximate.
We will check how the growth rates behave in any arbitrary period t. Define the
growth rates under both regimes as:
gG =
kGt+1
kGt
=
1
1 + nt+1
(
1
1 + nt
)δ−1
. . .
(
1
1 + n1
)δt−δt−1 (
(1− δ)(1− τ)
β(2 + d)
A
)δt+1
kδ
t+1−δt
0 (2.4.2)
gF =
kFt+1
kFt
=
1
1 + nt+1
(
1
1 + nt
)δ−1
. . .
(
1
1 + n1
)δt−δt−1 (
1− δ
2β
A
)δt+1
kδ
t+1−δt
0 (2.4.3)
The question is: is the growth rate of capital lower under PAYG than under FF?
gG
?
< gF (2.4.4)
⇐⇒ 1− τ
2 + τ (1− δ) δ−1 <
1
2
The above inequality shows that the answer is: yes. Not only the capital in effi-
ciency units is higher under FF, but also the growth rate is higher. This excludes the
possibility of a PAYG system to overhaul its lag concerning the aggregate capital.
From this follows that the production outputs will diverge over time.
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2.5 Welfare Comparison
So far we have made clear statements about the capital development under the two
different pension systems and saw that a fully funded pension system leads to a
higher physical capital stock. Nevertheless, we are interested in the individual wel-
fare of a single agent, which is influenced by a pension system. This characteristic
should be the basis for the decision, whether to switch from PAYG to FF or not.
The aggregate stock of capital has positive effects on wage income, but it has a
negative influence on the rate of return on capital. Both effects are decisive for the
development of the welfare/expected utility. As agents are homogeneous, aggregate
welfare is represented by the welfare of a representative agent.
Society’s prevalent opinion is that an FF ensures sustainability of the pension system
and higher welfare for agents. In this section we will show whether welfare is higher
under FF or under PAYG. We will make pointwise comparisons, hence we analyze
the life-time utility of a single agent in any arbitrary period t under both systems.
The aggregation of welfare over all periods up to period t is not considered. Hence,
the comparison is given by the following equivalence relation:
Et
[
UF (cFt,t, c
F
t+1,t)
]
> Et
[
UG(cGt,t, c
G
t+1,t)
]
⇐⇒ Et
[
ln(cFt,t) + ln(c
F
t+1,t)
]
> Et
[
ln(cGt,t) + ln(c
G
t+1,t)
]
⇐⇒ Et
[
ln
W F1 − sFt
WG1 − sGt
]
> Et
[
ln
RGt+1 s
G
t +W
G
2
RFt+1 (s
F
t + τ w
F
t ht)
]
. (2.5.1)
By using the expressions for consumption during adulthood and retirement and (in
a second step) the laws of motion under both pension systems we can rewrite the
above expression in the following way:
1
2
(1− δ)A(kFt )δht
1+d
2+d
(1− τ)(1− δ)A(kGt )δht
>
(
1
1+nt+1
)δ−1(
(1−τ)(1−δ)
2+d
)δ
htA
δ+1β1−δδ(1 + d)(kGt )
δ2
(1 + nt+1)1−δAδ+1β1−δ
(
1−δ
2
)δ
δht(kFt )
δ2
⇐⇒
(
2 + τ(1− δ)δ−1
2(1− τ)
) 1−δt+1
1−δ
> (1 + τ(1− δ)δ−1) 21+δ .
Decisions on pension systems are made with a long-run horizon. It can be that some
generations are worse off directly after the transition from one system to the other.
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As long as in the long run all generations are better off, a switch is reasonable. As
the capital intensity factor δ is less than one, we know: limt→∞ δt+1 = 0. Therefore,
the decisive inequality is given by:(
2 + τ (1− δ) δ−1
2 (1− τ)
) 1
1−δ ?
> (1 + τ (1− δ) δ−1) 21+δ (2.5.2)
The previous section showed that a social planner is able to determine an optimal
contribution rate τ ∗(δ) under PAYG and to implement this rate. This optimal
τ ∗(δ) only depends on the exogenous parameter δ. It makes sense to compare the
expected utilities under both regimes for an optimally chosen contribution rate. If
we plug in τ ∗(δ) =
1
4
δ2+2 δ− 1
4
− 1
4
√
δ4+8δ3+14δ2+8δ+1
δ−1 and assume 0 < δ < 2
√
3 − 3, we
see that the comparison relies only on the capital intensity factor δ. Hence, we are
able to determine intervals for δ such that the expected utility is higher under FF
than under PAYG. Define the difference of the expected utilities under both pension
regimes as:
∆U(δ) = Et
[
UF (cFt,t, c
F
t+1,t)
]− Et [UG(cGt,t, cGt+1,t)]
=

2 +
(
1
4δ
2 + 2 δ − 14 − 14
√
δ4 + 8δ3 + 14δ2 + 8δ + 1
δ − 1
)
(1− δ) δ−1
2
1−
 14δ2 + 2 δ − 14 − 14
√
δ4 + 8δ3 + 14δ2 + 8δ + 1
δ − 1



1
1−δ
−
(
1 +
(
1
4δ
2 + 2 δ − 14 − 14
√
δ4 + 8δ3 + 14δ2 + 8δ + 1
δ − 1
)
(1− δ) δ−1
) 2
1+δ
(2.5.3)
Proposition 2.5.1. The difference ∆U(δ) is a function of the parameter δ only.
The roots of ∆U(δ) are given for at least two values of δ: δ and δ¯ with 0 < δ.4
For values of δ smaller than δ or larger than δ¯, the difference function ∆U(δ) has
negative values. This shows that outside the interval (δ, δ¯) a PAYG pension system
yields higher welfare for its agents than an FF system. We cannot formally show that
no further root of ∆U(δ) exists within the interval (δ, δ¯). But numerical simulations
4For a proof see the Appendix.
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make the suggestion of two unique roots plausible. We are able to appropriate the
roots of ∆U(δ) by numerical methods as:
δ = 0.2654958759
δ¯ = 0.4641016153 ≈ 2
√
3− 3.
We can show that for δ = δmax ∈ (δ, δ¯) the function ∆U(δ) achieves its maxi-
mum value, which is positive. Therefore, ∆U(δ) receives positive values within the
interval (δ, δ¯) and negative values outside the interval. The value of δmax can be
determined numerically as δmax = 0.340681904 ≈ 0.34 and ∆U(δmax) > 0. The
second derivative5 of the utility difference function at this point is negative. From
this result we can deduce that for capital intensity factors δ lying in the interval
(δ, δ¯) the expected utility of a single agent under an FF pension system is strictly
higher than under PAYG. This means, an agent can gain higher welfare if the social
planner introduces a fully funded pension system. Outside this interval, but within
the possible value space of δ, such that an operating PAYG with positive contribu-
tion rates exists, the PAYG system is the dominant one regarding life-time utility.
Using the boundary behavior of ∆U(δ), given in the proof, we can conclude that
the fully funded pension system is strongly dominated by a PAYG one for values of
δ being small enough.
What we can see from this analysis is that a social planner is able to choose the
right pension system in the sense of the highest possible expected utility in the long
run. Relying on the prevalent capital intensity factor δ, he will adjust his decision.
It is not necessary to consider the height of human capital, the size of the physical
capital stock or the technology factor A. Also, the contribution rate is not a decisive
parameter since the expected utility under FF is completly independent of τ and
under PAYG the social planner determines the optimal contribution rate τ ∗(δ) by
the exogeneously given parameter δ.
To summarize, we cannot claim that the fully funded system is always better in
terms of expected welfare than the PAYG one. This stays in contrast to the predic-
tion of which system leads to higher economic growth. We showed numerically that
5 ∂∆U(δ
max)
∂δ = 0 and
∂2∆U(δmax)
∂δ2 ≈ −26.62 < 0
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the question of which pension system leads to higher welfare can be solved uniquely,
given the economic parameters. It is clear that the question of which system to
introduce, cannot be answered over all economies in the same way. Highly industri-
alized economies show a much higher fraction of physical capital than non developed
enonomies, whose production relies mostly on human capital. We are aware that
even in developed economies the capital intensity factor will take values below 0.56,
hence our determined intervall for δ (so that a PAYG system can be introduced with
strictly positive contribution rates) goes quite well in hand with observed real world
data.
Proposition 2.5.2. The PAYG pension system is the correct one in terms of welfare
for low developed economies7 who show up values for the capital intensity factor being
small enough, i.e. δ ≤ δ. For values of δ located in the intervall (δ, δ¯) we cannot
claim the dominance of one pension system unambiguously.
For a proof see before. 2
To demonstrate the dominance of the PAYG system for small δ values, assume
δ = 0 (under PAYG the savings decision, current and future consumption are not
determined for δ = 0). This leads to:
cFt+1,t = Rt+1(st + τ wt ht) = 0 (2.5.4)
as Rt+1 = δ A k
δ−1
t+1
δ=0
= 0. Hence
lim
δ→0
ln cFt+1,t = −∞ (2.5.5)
The rate of return on savings for δ → 0 under PAYG is zero in the limit as well.
But under PAYG agents receive a payment from the new young generation in their
second period of life. Hence, their consumption in the retirement period is never
equal to zero (except for τ = 0).
lim
δ→0
ln cGt+1,t = ln((1 + n˜t+1) τ w˜t+1β ht) > −∞ (2.5.6)
6Baffes and Shah (1993) showed that the elasticity of output with respect to the private capital
is smaller than 0.5 in most OECD and EMENA countries. The values for the rest of the world are
considerable below the one for the OECD countries
7Low developed economies are in our sense countries with low output elasticities with respect
to private capital.
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Consumption in the first period does not differ substantially under both pension
systems:
lim
δ→0
ln cGt,t = ln(Aht (1− τ)) ≥ ln
(
Aht
2
)
= lim
δ→0
ln cFt,t (2.5.7)
as τ ≤ 1
2
. Under FF zero consumption in the second period leads to such high
disutility that PAYG is the pension system which leads to the higher life-time utility.
The second period consumption under FF consists only on the return from the
capital market and, therefore, relies on the variability of this market which can lead
to zero old-age consumption if the market does not provide a positive return. A
PAYG pension system (with positive contribution rates) assures a positive old-age
income independent of the capital market. Hence, we can interpret a PAYG system
as a type of insurance against low rates of return.
2.5.1 Impact of human capital on welfare
The ratio of young contributors to beneficiaries (under PAYG) is shrinking in many
industrialized economies. One way to cope with this problem is to invest in higher
human capital. This would mean that not only the quantity of the contributors
counts but also the quality. Under a PAYG system higher human capital directly
influences the height of the pension payment as it increases the wage income of the
contributors. Furthermore, human capital appears through the rate of return on
physical capital. There is no direct effect of human capital on the pension payments
under an FF pension system, as the pension benefits are not based on the wage
income of the successors. But it has an effect on the rate of return like under
PAYG.
Using (2.3.6) and (2.3.10), the expected utility of a single agent under a PAYG
system is given by
Et[UG(·, ·)] = ln
(
1 + d
2 + d
(1− τ) (1− δ)A (kGt )δ ht
)
+ ln
((
(1− τ) (1− δ)
2 + d
)δ
htA
δ+1 β1−δ δ (1 + d) (kGt )
δ2
)
+ Et
[
ln
(
1
1 + n˜t+1
)δ−1]
.
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Under a fully funded system the expected utility is given by using (2.3.16) and
(2.3.20).
Et[UF (·, ·)] = ln
(
1
2
(1− δ)A(kFt )δ ht
)
+ ln
(
Aδ+1β1−δ
(
1− δ
2
)δ
δht(k
F
t )
δ2
)
+ Et
[
ln(1 + n˜t+1)
1−δ] .
An increase of the human capital production factor β in period t = 1 means that
the indivual human capital of an agent born/adult in period t = 1 grows stronger
than the human capital of their parental generation born/adult in period t = 0.
Such an increase of the factor β has no direct effect on the structure of savings and
consumption decision in the adult period no matter if a PAYG or an FF system
exists. This is due to the logarithmic utility function which bears no income effect.
Of course, the absolute numbers of savings and consumption will be changed by an
increase of β as wage income changes. The factor β affects utility out of consumption
in adulthood and in retirement under both pension systems in the same way. We
can easily see that the influence of the human capital growth factor β on welfare of
the parental generation is positive and equal under both regimes:
∂Et[UGt=0(·, ·)]
∂β
=
∂Et[UFt=0(·, ·)]
∂β
=
1− δ
β
> 0. (2.5.8)
There is no effect on the consumption during adulthood of the generation born
in t = 0. We find only an effect on consumption during retirement. Due to the
logarithmic form of the utility function the effect on ct+1,t is the same under both
types of pension systems.
We conclude that the generation, whose successors are endowed with higher human
capital, gain a higher expected utility. Hence, human capital production has a
positive effect on welfare. The first generation (born in period t=1), whose human
capital grows stronger than the one of their parents, will benefit and the following
generations even stronger (the factor β is not increased further) from an increase
of β in t = 1. This is due to the fact that the aggregation of kt is changed. Every
generation born after or in t = 1 experiences an influence on their consumption in
adulthood and retirement. The effect of an increase of β in t = 1 on the utility in
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every succeeding period t ≥ 1 can be expressed by:
∂Et[UG(·, ·)]
∂β
=
∂Et[UF (·, ·)]
∂β
=
2 t+ 1−∑ti=1 δi − δt+1
β
. (2.5.9)
This equation shows the effect of an increase in β in period t = 1 on the expected
utility of a generation born after or in t = 1. It demonstrates that the effect of an
increased β is for these generations stronger than the effect for the generation born
in t = 0 as
2 t+1−∑ti=1 δi−δt+1
β
> 1−δ
β
.
Proposition 2.5.3. An increase in human capital formation in period t, expressed
by a higher β, results in a welfare gain of the generation born in period t under
a PAYG pension system and under a fully funded one. It is the same under both
systems.
The effect of an increased growth factor on the agent’s welfare is the same under
both pension regimes due to the logarithmic form of the utility function. As it is
positive, a social planner has incentives to boost human capital formation. In our
model the human capital formation is given exogeneously. An increase of β could
be understood as an improvement of schooling.
2.6 Concluding remarks
In this simple OLG-setting with stochastic population growth and exogenous growth
of human capital, we showed that a fully funded system always leads to higher phys-
ical capital accumulation. This is consistent with the existing literature. The new
result considers the individual utility of agents. We showed that a fully funded
system in this respect is not always the best choice. If the government would intro-
duce a pension system with respect to the individual utility of the agents, the main
determining parameter would be the capital intensity factor. For countries with a
low factor, it is optimal to choose the PAYG system, whereas countries with high
capital intensity factors should go for a fully funded one. Hence the dominance of
FF is not given in terms of utility for all values of the capital intensity factor. The
overall claimed transition to an FF is, therefore, not optimal for all countries.
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2.7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.3.1 Define:
uG(τ) := ln
(
1 + d
2 + d
(1− τ) (1− δ)A (kGt )δ ht
)
+ ln
((
(1− τ) (1− δ)
2 + d
)δ
htA
δ+1 β1−δ δ (1 + d) (kGt )
δ2
)
+ Et
[
ln
(
1
1 + nt+1
)δ−1]
with d := τ(1− δ)δ−1.The first derivative of uG(τ) with respect to τ is given by
∂ uG(τ)
∂ τ
=
τ (δ(9− 7δ − δ2)− 1) + τ 2 (2 (1− δ (4− δ))) + δ (6δ − 3 + δ2)
(τ δ − δ − τ) (τ − 1) (τ δ − τ − 2δ)
=
g(τ)
f(τ)
.
From the FOC we can determine two optimal values for the contribution rate under
PAYG.
τ1(δ) =
1
4
δ2 + 2 δ − 1
4
− 1
4
√
δ4 + 8δ3 + 14δ2 + 8δ + 1
δ − 1
τ2(δ) =
1
4
δ2 + 2 δ − 1
4
+ 1
4
√
δ4 + 8δ3 + 14δ2 + 8δ + 1
δ − 1
The second value τ2(δ) is negative for all δ ∈ [0, 1) as the numerator is always pos-
itive while the denominator is negative. τ1(δ) presumes positive values for some
values of δ. We know that the function τ1(δ) has positive values for δ being small
8
and negative values for δ being large9. The function τ1(δ) is continuous and mono-
tonically decreasing10. By knowing this we can use the mean value theorem and
prove the existence of one unique root of τ1(δ). For δ = δˆ = 2
√
3− 3 the function is
given as τ1(δ = δˆ) = 0. Values of δ larger than δˆ will result in negative contribution
8τ1(δ = 0) =
1
2
9τ1(δ = 0.9) = −4.77
10 ∂τ1(δ)
∂δ =
√
(δ2+6δ+1) (δ+1)2 (δ2−2δ−7)+5+18δ+12δ2−2δ3−δ4√
(δ2+6δ+1) (δ+1)2 (δ−1)2 < 0
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rates. Therefore, we limit the contribution rate to zero for δ > δˆ. To prove that
τ = 0 is optimal for δ > δˆ we have to show that uG(τ) decreases in τ . It is sufficient
to show that the first derivative of uG(τ) is negative for any arbitrary values of
τ ≥ 0. As we have only two roots of ∂ uG(τ)
∂ τ
and τ2(δ) < τ1(δ), it is sufficient to show
that ∂ u
G(τ)
∂ τ
< 0 for one value of τ larger than τ1(δ).
∂ uG(τ)
∂ τ
∣∣∣∣
τ=0,δ≥δˆ
=
δ (6 δ − 3 + δ2)
−2 δ2 < 0
as δ (6 δ − 3 + δ2) > 0.
On the interval τ ∈ [0, 1] the function uG(τ) has a local maximum for τ ∗(δ) = τ1(δ)
as
∂uG(τ)
∂τ
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ∗(δ)
= 0
∂2uG(τ)
∂τ 2
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ∗(δ)
=
g′(τ ∗(δ)) f(τ ∗(δ))− f ′(τ ∗(δ)) g(τ ∗(δ))
(f(τ ∗(δ)))2
≤ 0 ∀ δ ∈ (0, 2
√
3− 3]
and the value of the function at the point τ = τ ∗(δ) is positive. Since
f(τ ∗(δ)) ≤ 0
g(τ ∗(δ)) ≤ 0
f ′(τ ∗(δ)) ≤ 0
g′(τ ∗(δ)) > 0,
we derive ∂
2uG(τ)
∂τ2
∣∣∣
τ=τ∗(δ)
≤ 0.
2
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Proof of Proposition 2.5.1
The function ∆U(δ) depends only on the parameter δ, which is exogenously given
and lies within the interval (0, 1). The function is continuous but not monotone.
The boundary behavior of this function can be described by:
lim
δ→0
∆U(δ) = −∞
lim
δ→1
∆U(δ) = −1
For some values11 of δ ∈ [0, 1] the function ∆U(δ) presumes positive values. By
using the mean value theorem we can prove that the function has at least two roots
given by δ and δ¯.
It cannot be shown formally that no further roots exist, i.e. it cannot be proven
that ∆U(δ) has only one maximum value on the intervall δ ∈ [0, 1]. This means
that ∆U(δ) < 0 is possible for δ ∈ (δ, δ¯). 2
11For δ = 0.35 the difference function is greater than zero: ∆U(δ = 0.35) ≈ 0.22.
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Chapter 3
Pension Systems, Endogenous
Fertility and Welfare
Abstract: This chapter is concerned with the influence of different pension systems,
i.e. pay-as-you-go (PAYG) or fully funded (FF), and different payment schemes, i.e.
Beveridge (flat) or Bismarck (contribution related), on fertility and on welfare of
agents. Most existing papers analyze the relation between pension systems and eco-
nomic growth. For a well-grounded statement on the “quality” of pension systems,
welfare should be the crucial criterion. Heterogenous individuals who differ in their
human capital endowment are considered. The relation between welfare and/or
fertility and pension systems/payment schemes strongly depends on the height of
the human capital endowment of agents. This leads to the conclusion that differ-
ent types of agents prefer different combinations of pension systems and payment
schemes. The model shows that all agents have more children under an FF system.
Transfer payments to high-skilled agents raise their fertility and, therefore, average
human capital implying higher economic growth.
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3.1 Introduction
Publically organized pension systems are a main factor of financing consumption
and life of old-age pensioners. To visualize numbers, Diamond and Orzag (2005)
exposed for the USA that for two-thirds of the elderly beneficiaries, public pension
payments are the majority of income and for 20 percent of the beneficiaries it is the
only income. Similar numbers can be found for most western countries. Therefore,
it is important to ensure sustainability of pension systems. Most western countries
organize their public pension system in the form of a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system.
In this system the government collects contributions as a fixed fraction of wage in-
come from the working population and pays them directly to the old age retirees.
A PAYG system is, therefore, a pure reallocation of income from young working
agents to old retired agents. Children and parents negotiated a so called “genera-
tion contract”. Such a pension system faces two problems in the real economy: 1.
demographic change and 2. low fertility of high-skilled agents. The first leads to
a higher fraction of old retired agents to young working agents who contribute to
the pension systems. This is due to better health care and better living situations
which have led to a higher life span. Furthermore fertility rates decrease throughout
the population. This is a common fact in many countries – industrialized as well as
developing economies.
A low average human capital leads to low contributions and consequentially to low
pension payments. In Germany at least a minimum pension payment is guaranteed.
Financing such a public pension system by less (and worse educated) agents could
generate a gap in the public budget. A switch from a PAYG to a fully funded (FF)
system is often discussed in the public media. Since an FF system does not include
a generation contract, i.e. no reallocation of wage income from young working agents
to old retired agents, it does not face the problems of a demographic change.
Most existing papers which analyze the advantages of the two pension systems
restrain their focus on economic growth. In our opinion welfare of human beings
would be a far better criterion to judge on the “quality” of pension systems. We
showed in the previous chapter that although an FF system leads to higher economic
growth, a PAYG system ensures higher welfare under specific conditions. Within
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the framework of an OLG-model and using a small open economy, this chapter
considers the impact of the structure of pension systems and payment schemes
on the welfare of heterogenous agents, measured in terms of individual life-time
utility, in the economy. One result is that PAYG as well as FF can dominate the
other one depending on economic parameters. The two major pension systems
are considered, each in combination with two different payment schemes: Beveridge
(flat) and Bismarck (contribution related). Heterogeneity of agents is one additional
aspect which distinguishes our work from many other papers as often homogeneity
of agents is assumed. For simplicity, we introduce only two different types of agents:
low-skilled (low individual human capital) and high-skilled (high individual human
capital). The agents differ according to their human capital endowment but are
equipped with the same preferences. Depending on their individual types, agents
prefer different payment schemes regarding their individual welfare. Their birth
rates also differ under different schemes.
High-skilled agents will have at most the same number of children as the low-skilled
agents under all four possible combinations of pension systems and payment schemes.
Excluding a learning process, this leads to a decrease of average human capital over
time. Since this results in a lowering of output per capita, which is often used as an
indicator for welfare, we ask whether incentives can be introduced to raise fertility of
high-skilled agents. By introducing transfer payments it is possible to raise fertility
and through this to increase average human capital. Incentives, given in the form
of transfer payments, are financed as a fraction of the total budget of the pension
system meaning that high-skilled as well as low-skilled agents contribute to these
transfer payments. As these incentives work in the intended direction we further
analyze whether additional advantages like an increase of individual’s welfare goes
hand in hand.
A learning process is not regarded in this paper, i.e. human capital of each agent
is fixed to the amount endowed with at birth. The focus lies on the correlation
between pension systems/payment schemes and human capital with reference to
fertility. The decision for learning is affected by initial human capital but also by
the prevailing pension system. Therefore, the influence of pension systems on the
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fertility of different types of agents would not clearly be visible if a learning process
is included.
3.2 Model
This paper uses an OLG model and distinguishes between two types of agents. Like
Kaganovich and Meier (2008) we consider a small open economy where perfectly
competitive firms produce a single homogeneous good that can be used for con-
sumption and investment. They use physical and human capital as input factors
in a constant returns neoclassical production technology F (K,H). For simplicity
the interest rate R is assumed to be constant over time. Using a constant returns
technology the wage rate w per human capital is constant as well. In this model
physical capital will be mobile whereas human capital is immobile.
Each individual lives exactly for three periods without the risk of an early demise:
childhood, working period and retirement. We distinguish between two types of
agents who are indexed by their type L or H and by their generation t = 0, 1, 2 . . . .
We label the generation whose working period occurs in period t as “generation t”.
The two types I = L,H of agents differ only in their endowment of human capital,
hL 6= hH , but not in their preferences. Type L agents are low-skilled whereas type H
agents are high-skilled so that hL < hH holds. Both supply inelastically one unit of
labor to the firms in their adult period and receive a wage income which is taxed by
a pension contribution rate τ . When agents are adult they decide whether to have
children or not and if so how many, nt ≥ 0. Since we assume human reproduction to
be asexual, fertility is an individual decision of a single agent. Each agent will have
children of the same type as himself, i.e. a type I agent will have nIt ≥ 0, n ∈ R+,
children of the same type I as himself. The total working population in period t+ 1
is, therefore, given by Nt+1 = n
L
t N
L
t +n
H
t N
H
t . Further we assume individual human
capital to be constant, i.e. we exclude a learning process. In period t = 0 we have
the same number of working agents of type L and type H: NL0 = N
H
0 , i.e. the initial
average human capital is determined as h¯0 =
hL+hH
2
. The average human capital
depends only on the human capital of the working population and not on the one
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of the retired agents and also not on the one of children.
Since each agent supplies one unit of labor inelastically to the firms, he receives
wage income according to his individual human capital W I = whI . He has to con-
tribute to the publically financed pension system an amount τwhI and to release
a certain fraction of his wage income to finance child consumption ρnItwh
I . These
child costs are mandatory for having children. Each child of an agent I causes the
same costs, i.e. there are no positive scale effects. As the costs per child are a fixed
fraction of the wage income it is more costly (in absolute terms) to raise children for
agents with higher individual human capital. In absolute terms they also contribute
a higher amount to the pension system.
The preferences of a single agent are described by a log-utility function which is
additively separable in its arguments:
U I(ct,t, ct+1,t, nt) = α ln c
I
t,t + β ln c
I
t+1,t + θ lnn
I
t (3.2.1)
where α, β, θ > 0 are factors displaying preferences for his own consumption when
young and respectively when old and for having children. cIt,t denotes consumption
in period t of an adult agent of type I born in t− 1 and working in t while cIt+1,t is
his consumption in t+ 1. Consumption as a child does not affect utility directly. It
is integrated in the utility of parents. Children cannot make any decisions, therefore
the analysis of childhood is excluded. The adult working agents allocate their after-
tax (after contributions) wage income between current own consumption, savings for
future consumption and costs for having children. Hence, agents face the following
budget constraint in their working period:
cIt,t = (1− τ − ρnIt )whI − sIt (3.2.2)
Consumption budget in the old period, i.e. when retired, is given by returns on
savings and by pension payments T It+1 which depend on the type of the agent. The
constraint is therefore:
cIt+1,t = Rs
I
t + T
I
t+1 (3.2.3)
Assuming an utility maximizing agent we can write his objective function as:
max
st,nt,ct,t,ct+1,t
U I(ct,t, ct+1,t, nt) = max
st,nt,ct,t,ct+1,t
α ln cIt,t + β ln c
I
t+1,t + θ lnn
I
t (3.2.4)
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subject to the budget constraints given in (3.2.2) and (3.2.3). Without making
further assumptions on pension payments T It+1 and taking R and w as given, we
derive private savings and the number of children born by a single agent I in the
following general way:
sIt =
β(1− τ − ρnIt )whI − αT
I
t+1
R
α + β
(3.2.5)
nIt =
1− τ + T It+1
whIR
ρ
θ
(α + β + θ)
for I = L,H (3.2.6)
The decision for savings is not restricted to positive amounts (raising of credit is
possible) due to the fact that retirees receive a pension payment out of which they
can fulfill their credit obligations. Decisions for children are restricted to positive
but not to integer numbers.
Two types of pension systems are considered as well as two different payment
schemes – Beveridge and Bismarck – for an analysis of their effects on fertility and
welfare. A Beveridge scheme (we use superscript f , short for “flat”, for indexation)
is a flat system which pays every retiree the same amount no matter how much he
contributed to the pension system when young.
TLt+1 = T
H
t+1 = Tt+1 (3.2.7)
A Bismarck scheme (using superscript c, short for “contribution related”) is a con-
tribution related system which determines pension payments according to the own
contributions:
THt+1
TLt+1
=
hH
hL
. (3.2.8)
A PAYG pension system is indexed by a superscript G whereas a fully funded system
is indicated by a superscript F . Whenever it is possible we drop the superscripts.
3.2.1 Decisions under PAYG
The PAYG pension system is the predominant system in most industrialized coun-
tries. It is characterized by a reallocation of wage income. Young working consumers
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are forced by the government to release a part of their wage income (contributions)
to the pension system. The PAYG system collects the contributions but they are
not used as physical capital in the production process. Instead, the system gives
them directly to the living old-age pensioners (beneficiaries). Hence, we observe a
pure reallocation of wage income from young to old adults.
In equilibrium the aggregate amount of pension payments must equal aggregate con-
tributions. As young agents pay for the parental generation, we derive the budget
constraint of a PAYG pension system in the following way:
NLt T
L
t+1 +N
H
t T
H
t+1 = τw
(
NLt+1h
L +NHt+1h
H
)
(3.2.9)
with N It+1 = n
I
tN
I
t .
Definition 3.2.1. Given the initial stock of agents N I0 with I = L,H, individual
levels of human capital hI and the exogenously given and fixed rate of return R, a
dynamic competitive equilibrium (DCE) is a sequence of individual agent’s decisions{
nIt , s
I
t , c
I
t,t, c
I
t+1,t
}∞
t=0
, a sequence of factor prices of labor {wt}∞t=0 and the sequence
of pension payments
{
T It+1
}∞
t=0
so that:
• For each L,H ∈ I and t = 0, 1, . . . , the collection of nIt , sIt , cIt,t, cIt+1,t solves
the individuals’ household problem (3.2.2)– (3.2.4) where factor prices w,R
and future pension payments T It+1 are taken as given.
• Factor markets clear. Factor markets are competitive, hence, according to
the economy’s production function the factor prices are determined by their
marginal products.
Rt = FK(
Kt
Ht
, 1)
wt = FH(
Kt
Ht
, 1)
• Individual pension payments received by generation t retirees are always defined
in such a way that (3.2.9) holds.
Due to the small open economy assumption R is exogenously given and for simplicity
fixed. The constant returns neoclassical production technology in combination with
R constant leads to a constant wage rate w.
47
3. Endogenous Fertility and Welfare
Plugging (3.2.6), (3.2.7) and (3.2.8) into (3.2.9) we determine equilibrium pension
payments under the different payment schemes (e.g. Bismarck and Beveridge) as:
Beveridge: T fGt+1 = T
LfG
t+1 = T
HfG
t+1 =
ατ(1− τ)wh¯fGt R
AR− ατ (3.2.10)
Bismarck: T I
cG
t+1 =
ατ(1− τ)whIR
AR− ατ for I = L,H (3.2.11)
With A defined as A := αρ
θ
(α + β + θ). We assume that AR is larger than ατ
so that AR − ατ > 0 and, therefore, all pension payments are positive (negative
pension payments are per definition excluded from a system with PAYG and also
FF). Therefore, we receive the birth rates in equilibrium for the two payment schemes
in the following way:
nI
fG
t =
α
A
(1− τ)
AR + ατ
(
h¯fGt
hI
− 1
)
AR− ατ (3.2.12)
nI
cG
t =
α
A
(1− τ) AR
AR− ατ for I = L,H (3.2.13)
Equation (3.2.13) shows that individual birth rates under a Bismarck scheme are
completely independent of the individual human capital. Both types of agents have
the same number of children under this scheme. In contrast birth rates under Bev-
eridge depend on the rate of average human capital in period t to individual human
capital. This is due to the fact that every agent receives the same pension payment,
i.e. an average one. Under Beveridge, child costs are private whereas benefits from
children are in a certain way (flat pension payments) public.
3.2.2 Decisions under FF
There is a significant difference in the way the two different types of pension systems
work. While the PAYG system collects contributions from young consumers and
transmits them directly to the pensioners, the FF system collects contributions and
invests them in the production process for one period. The FF pension system’s
savings are invested in the production technology and earn a return. The single
consumer is equipped with the same logarithmic and additively separable utility
function as under the PAYG system. But as the FF system works in a different way,
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the pension benefit payments are defined differently. The budget constraint of an
FF pension system is described by the following equation:
NLt T
L
t+1 +N
H
t T
H
t+1 = Rτw
(
NLt h
L +NHt h
H
)
(3.2.14)
In equilibrium the two possible pension payments (according to a Bismarck or Bev-
eridge pension scheme) are determined by using (3.2.7) respectively (3.2.8) and
plugged into (3.2.14):
Beveridge: T fFt+1 = T
LfF
t+1 = T
HfF
t+1 = τwh¯tR (3.2.15)
Bismarck: T I
cF
t+1 = τwh
IR (3.2.16)
Plugging (3.2.15) and (3.2.16) in the general formula for birth rates (3.2.6) we de-
rive the equilibrium birth rates under a fully funded pension system with either a
Beveridge or a Bismarck scheme:
nI
fF
t =
α
A
[
1 + τ
(
h¯fFt
hI
− 1
)]
(3.2.17)
nI
cF
t =
α
A
for I = L,H (3.2.18)
This shows the same link between individual/average human capital and birth rates
as under a PAYG system. Under a Bismarck system birth rates are again indepen-
dent of individual and average human capital whereas under Beveridge birth rates
depend on the ratio of average to individual human capital.
3.2.3 Analysis of birth rates
The previous sections show that birth rates under a Bismarck scheme are indepen-
dent of human capital, i.e. agents with low human capital decide to have the same
number of children as agents with high human capital. This model uses a loga-
rithmic utility function, hence, birth rates and savings are independent of the wage
income. Therefore, both types of agents make the same decisions if there is no other
distortionary effect. Under Bismarck pension payments are determined according to
the relation of individual contributions to contributions by the other agents. From
this it follows that an agent with high human capital (contributes more) does not
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finance partwise old-age consumption of the low human capital agents (contribute
less). Therefore, under a Bismarck scheme no distortionary costs influence birth
rates. Also, wage income does not determine birth rates but the cost factor ρ of
having children plays a major role. The higher the cost factor of children the less
children agents decide to have. Under a Beveridge scheme the ratio of average and
individual human capital is important for birth rates. If we define the birth rate as
a function of human capital nt(h), we derive the following:
∂nfGt
∂h
= −α
A
(1− τ) ατ
h¯t
h
AR− ατ < 0 (3.2.19)
∂nfFt
∂h
= −α
A
τ
h¯t
h
< 0 (3.2.20)
The influence of human capital on birth rates under a Beveridge scheme is, therefore,
negative. Meaning that under a Beveridge payment scheme (no matter if PAYG or
FF) agents with higher individual human capital will have less children, i.e. birth
rates decrease in individual human capital. In contrast, individual human capital
does not affect birth rates under a Bismarck scheme1.
Proposition 3.2.2. Under each pension system and each payment scheme low-
skilled agents have at least the same number of children as high-skilled agents.
If a Beveridge scheme is implemented, agents of type H (with high human capital)
suffer a kind of loss through the pension payment. They contribute a significantly
higher amount to the pension system than agents with low human capital but as
a retiree they receive the same pension payment as agents of type L, i.e. they face
higher costs but the same benefits. Knowing this mechanism we can ask whether
birth rates are influenced by the type of payment scheme, i.e. whether H-agents
(and L-agents) have more children under a Beveridge scheme or under a Bismarck
payment scheme.
Proposition 3.2.3. In an economy with heterogenous agents individuals with low
individual human capital (L-type agents) have more children under a Beveridge pay-
ment scheme than under a Bismarck scheme. In contrast, high-skilled agents have
1If we would assume a CRRA utility function like U(ct,t, ct+1,t, nt) =
1
1−σ
(
αc1−σt,t + βc
1−σ
t+1,t + θn
1−σ
t
)
birth rates would depend under all pension systems and
payment schemes negatively on human capital as long as σ < 1.
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more children under a Bismarck than under a Beveridge scheme no matter which
type of pension system is introduced.
We derive under a PAYG system the following equivalence relation:
nL
fG
t ≥ nL
cG
t (3.2.21)
⇐⇒ α
A
(1− τ)
AR + ατ
(
h¯fGt
hL
− 1
)
AR− ατ ≥
α
A
(1− τ) AR
AR− ατ
⇐⇒ h¯fGt ≥ hL.
We know that human capital of high-skilled agents is higher than that of low-skilled
agents, i.e. hL < hH . Therefore we know hL ≤ h¯t ≤ hH for all periods t ≥ 0 and
for all combinations of pension systems and payment schemes. Only in case where
no high-skilled (low-skilled) agents exist, h¯t = h
L (h¯t = h
H) holds. Hence, L-agents
have more (or equal – if no H-type agents exist) children under a Beveridge than
under a Bismarck scheme if a PAYG system is implemented. For agents of type H
we derive the following equivalence relation:
nH
fG
t ≤ nH
cG
t (3.2.22)
⇐⇒ α
A
(1− τ)
AR + ατ
(
h¯fGt
hH
− 1
)
AR− ατ ≤
α
A
(1− τ) AR
AR− ατ
⇐⇒ h¯fGt ≤ hH .
Hence, high-skilled agents have more children under a Bismarck payment scheme.
Under a fully funded pension system we derive the same results with an analogous
proof.
Comparing birth rates under PAYG and FF we derive a strict ordering of them
under the four possible combinations of pension systems and payment schemes.
Proposition 3.2.4. Both types of agents, low-skilled and high-skilled, have more
children under a fully funded pension system than under a PAYG system if the rate
of return is sufficiently high. This holds independently of the implemented payment
scheme.
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Comparing the birth rates of a low-skilled agent under a Bismarck FF system and
under a Beveridge PAYG system leads to the following equivalence relation:
nL
cF
t > n
LfG
t (3.2.23)
⇐⇒ α
A
>
α
A
(1− τ)
AR + ατ
(
h¯fGt
hL
− 1
)
AR− ατ
⇐⇒ R > (1− τ)α
h¯fGt
hL
+ ατ
A
=
(1− τ) h¯fGt
hL
+ τ
α
αθ
ρ(α + β + θ)
.
Knowing that low-skilled agents have more children under a Beveridge payment
scheme we can claim that if nL
cF
t > n
LfG
t holds, n
LfF
t > n
LcG
t holds as well. If
R >
(1−τ)α h¯
fG
t
hL
+ατ
A
holds, we can affirm the following relation regarding the birth
rates of low-skilled agents: nL
cG
t < n
LfG
t < n
LcF
t < n
LfF
t . Hence, a strict ordering of
the height of birth rates exists. For high-skilled agents we compare the following:
nH
cG
t < n
HfF
t (3.2.24)
⇐⇒ (1− τ) AR
AR− ατ < 1 + τ
(
h¯fFt
hH
− 1
)
⇐⇒ (1− τ)ατ < τ h
H
h¯fFt
(AR− ατ) (3.2.25)
(1− τ)α hH
h¯fFt
+ ατ
A
< R (3.2.26)
We know already, high-skilled agents have more children under a Bismarck payment
scheme no matter which type of pension system is implemented. Therefore, the
relation nH
fG
t < n
HcG
t < n
HfF
t < n
HcF
t holds as long as R >
α
A
((1− τ) hH
h¯fFt
+ τ).
If the rate of return is sufficiently high under an FF system, savings used for old-age
consumption can be reduced. Lower savings increase free disposal income in adult-
hood which can be used for raising more children. If the factor expressing “joy”
of having children θ is low and the cost factor of children ρ is high, the relation
R > α
A
((1 − τ) hH
h¯fFt
+ τ), i.e. R > α
A
((1 − τ) h¯fGt
hL
+ τ), may be fulfilled already for
“small” values of R.
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We showed above that under an FF pension system both types of agents are willing
to have more children than under a PAYG system. Facing the problem of a demo-
graphic change, as most industrialized countries are experiencing at the moment,
and knowing that most European countries possess a public PAYG pension system,
it could be one part of a solution to switch to an FF pension system. This leads to
higher fertility of all agents in our model. Such a switch is already often discussed
not especially to stimulate fertility but to cope financing gaps due to demographic
change.
3.2.4 Welfare Comparison
Many papers dealing with social security systems focus on growth effects of different
systems. They conclude that an FF system leads to higher physical capital accu-
mulation and, therefore, to higher economic growth. In our work we can confirm
higher physical capital accumulation as well. But our interest lies not on growth
effects but on welfare effects since higher economic growth does not necessarily lead
to higher welfare. In a closed economy this becomes even more visible as higher
capital accumulation leads in equilibrium to higher wages but at the same time to
lower rates of return. As we assume a small open economy, rates of return are given
exogenously (and fixed for simplicity) and are, therefore, not influenced by higher
aggregate capital. Due to the constant returns production function the wage rate
is fixed over time as well. Nevertheless, different types of agents can benefit or
lose from different pension systems. If we use equilibrium pension payments, birth
rates and savings as described above and plug them into (3.2.2) and (3.2.3), we de-
rive equilibrium consumption streams in both periods for all possible combinations
of pension systems and payment schemes. Consumption for a type I agent (with
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I = L,H) in period t is given in the following way:
Beveridge PAY G : cI
fG
t,t =
α
α + β
(1− τ)(1− αρ
A
)
[
hI +
ατ
AR− ατ h¯
fG
t
]
w
Bismarck PAY G : cI
cG
t,t =
α
α + β
(1− τ)(1− αρ
A
)
AR
AR− ατ wh
I
Beveridge FF : cI
fF
t,t =
α
α + β
(1− αρ
A
)[hI + τ(h¯fFt − hI)]w
Bismarck FF : cI
cF
t,t =
α
α + β
(1− αρ
A
)whI .
Consumption in retirement period t+ 1 is given as:
Beveridge PAY G : cI
fG
t+1,t =
β
α + β
(1− τ)(1− αρ
A
)
[
hI +
ατ
AR− ατ h¯
fG
t
]
wR
Bismarck PAY G : cI
cG
t+1,t =
β
α + β
(1− τ)(1− αρ
A
)
AR
AR− ατ wh
IR
Beveridge FF : cI
fF
t+1,t =
β
α + β
(1− αρ
A
)[hI + τ(h¯fFt − hI)]wR
Bismarck FF : cI
cF
t+1,t =
β
α + β
(1− αρ
A
)whIR.
The first question we would like to answer is whether different types of agents would
prefer different types of payment schemes in terms of individual welfare. We use life-
time utility U I(ct,t, ct+1,t, nt) in this section as a measurement for welfare. Since the
utility function is monotonically increasing in its three arguments and as all three
arguments are larger under one system if one argument is larger, it is sufficient to
compare the arguments of the utility functions themselfes. We derive for a type L
agent under a PAYG system the following:
cL
cG
t,t
cL
cG
t+1,t
nL
cG
t


cL
fG
t,t
cL
fG
t+1,t
nL
fG
t

and under an FF system: 
cL
cF
t,t
cL
cF
t+1,t
nL
cF
t


cL
fF
t,t
cL
fF
t+1,t
nL
fF
t
 .
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Obviously, an agent who has only an endowment of low human capital will gain from
a Beveridge payment scheme and suffer from a Bismarck scheme under a PAYG as
well as under an FF pension system. This is due to the fact that under Bismarck
agents receive only pension payments according to their own contribution but under
Beveridge all agents receive the same pension payment no matter how much they
contributed themselves. Hence, a low human capital type agent will gain from the
higher contributions of type H agents.
For a type H agent the following holds under PAYG:
cH
cG
t,t
cH
cG
t+1,t
nH
cG
t


cH
fG
t,t
cH
fG
t+1,t
nH
fG
t

and under an FF system: 
cH
cF
t,t
cH
cF
t+1,t
nH
cF
t


cH
fF
t,t
cH
fF
t+1,t
nH
fF
t
 .
The discrete arguments, consumption in adulthood cHt,t, consumption in retirement
cHt+1,t and the number of children n
H
t , are all higher under a Bismarck scheme. Hence,
the life-time utility of an H-agent is higher under Bismarck than under Beveridge
no matter if a PAYG or an FF system is introduced. This is due to the fact that an
H-agent receives less pension payments under a Beveridge scheme as he loses some
amount to L-agents and the costs of having children are proportionally higher.
Proposition 3.2.5. Independently from the pension system prevailing in the econ-
omy, low-skilled agents will gain from a Beveridge payment scheme and suffer from
a Bismarck scheme, whereas the opposite is true for high-skilled agents.
If we assume that a Bismarck scheme is implemented, we can investigate whether
one type or even both types of agents benefit by introducing either a PAYG or an
FF pension system2. By comparing the discrete arguments of the life-time utilty
2In our comparison we leave the generation which is retired in the period when a pension system
is implemented, unattended. In reality this generation is the critical one as we have to solve the
problem of financing their pension payments when switching from a PAYG to an FF system.
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function of both types of agents we observe the following simultaneously for both
agents: 
cI
cF
t,t
cI
cF
t+1,t
nI
cF
t


cI
cG
t,t
cI
cG
t+1,t
nI
cG
t
 if R > θρ(α + β + θ) .
This means that both types of agents derive a higher life-time utility if an FF pen-
sion system is introduced as all discrete arguments are higher under FF than under
PAYG in case the rate of return is sufficiently high. Under an FF system pension
payments depend purely on the rate of return and not on the next generation and,
therefore, not on the number of children. Consumption in adulthood, consumption
in retirement and having children are substitution goods in our model. If a suffi-
ciently high rate of return leads to high pension payments, agents are in a position
to save less and to consume more in adulthood and to have more children. A suf-
ficiently high R leads to a life-time income which is higher under an FF system
than life-time income under a PAYG system. The height of the critical value of R
depends on the factors α, β, θ and the cost factor of children ρ.
Proposition 3.2.6. If the rate of return is sufficiently high, i.e. R > θ
ρ(α+β+θ)
, all
types of agents can derive a higher life-time utility under a Bismarck fully funded
pension system than under a Bismarck PAYG pension system in all periods t ≥ 0.
R > θ
ρ(α+β+θ)
is fulfilled if the cost factor ρ of having children is sufficiently high or
the factor θ of “joy” through children is sufficiently low.
3.3 Transfer Payments
In the previous section we were able to show which type of pension system leads
to higher welfare in terms of individual life-time-utility. It is quite difficult for a
government to observe individual life-time utility. If a government should decide
which type of pension system to implement, its decision should, for this reason,
rely on a different measurement. One possible measurement is output per capita
since aggregate output as well as the number of agents in each generation is easy to
determine. The considered economy in this model is a small open one with mobile
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physical capital but immobile human capital. Due to perfect physical capital mo-
bility, a neoclassic production technology with constant returns and a constant rate
of return, physical capital will be supplied in equilibrium in a constant proportion
to human capital. This implies that aggregate output grows at the same rate as the
human capital accumulation. To determine output per capita we need the average
human capital per capita.
In the last section we saw that both types of pension systems and also both types
of payment schemes lead to higher birth rates of agents endowed with low human
capital. The high-skilled agents, i.e. the ones endowed with high human capital,
give birth to less children than the less endowed agents. Therefore, we observe a
decreasing human capital per capita/average human capital over time. Also, this
means that the economy faces a decreasing output per capita over time. If we in-
terpret output per capita as an indicator for the welfare of agents, welfare decreases
over time. The question we would like to address in this section is: is it possible
to stimulate fertility of high-skilled agents by giving incentives and does this lead
to a higher average human capital? In our simple model individual human capital
is assumed to be constant over time. Therefore, average human capital changes by
changing the proportions of low- and high-skilled agents in the population. As we
want to stimulate only the fertility of high-potential agents, one type of incentives
is a transfer payment for agents with high human capital. We assume transfer pay-
ments to be payed to type H agents in their retirement period on top of their regular
pension payments. Transfer payments are payed out of the pension system’s budget,
meaning that both types of agents pay for them but only high-skilled agents benefit
from them. The aggregate transfer payments are an -fraction of the pension sys-
tem’s budget. As this budget is changing over time, the absolute value of aggregate
transfer payments is changing as well.
Although transfer payments have an impact on pension payments and through this
on the budget constraints, they do not structurally change the decision process of
low-skilled agents. Therefore, an agent’s common savings decision and his decision
for children are described by (3.2.5) and (3.2.6). As type H agents receive transfer
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payments their maximization problem changes slightly:
maxUH = max(α ln cHt,t + β ln c
H
t+1,t + θ lnn
H
t )
s.t.
cHt,t = (1− τ − ρnHt )wthHt − sHt (3.3.1)
cHt+1,t = Rs
H
t + T
H
t+1 +
Bt+1
NHt
. (3.3.2)
Bt+1 (determined later) is the aggregate amount of transfer payments given to all
retirees of type H in period t + 1. Therefore, it has to be divided by the number
of type H agents old in t + 1 to derive the individual transfer payment of a single
agent H. Obviously adult consumption is not influenced structurally by a transfer
payment. Consumption as a H-type retiree cHt+1,t now consists not only of a return
on savings and pension payments but also of transfer payments. Without making
further assumptions on pension payments THt+1 and transfer payments
Bt+1
NHt
the rule
for private savings and the number of children is given in the following general way:
sHt =
β(1− τ − ρnHt )whL − αT
H
t+1+Bt+1/N
H
t
R
α + β
(3.3.3)
nHt = α
1− τ + THt+1+Bt+1/NHt
whLR
ρ
θ
(α + β + θ)
. (3.3.4)
3.3.1 Decisions under PAYG
We assume that both payment schemes (Bismarck and Beveridge) are characterized
as before. In equilibrium one additional condition has to be fulfilled. The following
holds:
Bt+1 = τw
(
NLt+1h
L +NHt+1h
H
)
(3.3.5)
NLt T
L
t+1 +N
H
t T
H
t+1 = (1− )τw
(
NLt+1h
L +NHt+1h
H
)
(3.3.6)
Plugging (3.2.6) and (3.3.4) into (3.3.5) and (3.3.6) and using (3.2.7) and (3.2.8) we
derive the individual transfer payment under PAYG of a type H agent as:
BGt+1
NHt
=
ταwR(1− τ)HGt /NHt
AR− τα (3.3.7)
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The transfer payments are determined under both payment schemes in the same
way as we assume that high-skilled agents always receive an -fraction of the pension
system’s total budget. Meaning that there is no link between the payment scheme
and transfer payments. Pension payments under the two types of payment schemes
differ and are listed below.
Beveridge: T fGt+1 = T
LfG
t+1 =T
HfG
t+1 =
(1− )τα(1− τ)wh¯fGt R
AR− τα (3.3.8)
Bismarck: T I
cG
t+1 =
(1− )τα(1− τ)whIR
AR− τα for I = L,H
(3.3.9)
Obviously pension payments for a type L agent are higher under a Beveridge scheme
and for a type H agent they are higher under a Bismarck scheme as hL < h¯fGt < h
H
(as long as both types of agents exist). This is due to the fact that under a Beveridge
payment scheme pension payments are equal for both types of agents. Under such
a scheme type L agents benefit from higher contributions of type H agents whereas
type H agents suffer due to the same reason. Using these equilibrium pension
payments we determine equilibrium birth rates under the two payments schemes for
L and H agents in the following way.
Beveridge:
nL
fG
t =
α
A
1− τ
AR− τα [(1− )τα
h¯fGt
hL
+ AR− τα] (3.3.10)
nH
fG
t =
α
A
1− τ
AR− τα [(1− )τα
h¯fGt
hH
+ AR− τα + τα H
fG
t
NH
fG
t h
H
] (3.3.11)
Bismarck:
nL
cG
t =
α
A
1− τ
AR− τα [AR− τα] (3.3.12)
nH
cG
t =
α
A
1− τ
AR− τα [AR− τα + τα
HcGt
NH
cG
t h
H
] (3.3.13)
With Ht being the aggregate human capital in period t : Ht = N
L
t h
L + NHt h
H .
We can directly see that under a Bismarck scheme birth rates of individuals with
high human capital are higher than those of agents with low human capital. This
indicates a first success of the politics of incentives. Whether they are higher under a
Beveridge scheme has to be proven. We will later take a closer look at this question.
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3.3.2 Decision under FF
Under a fully funded pension system the following holds in equilibrium:
Bt+1 = Rτw
(
NLt h
L +NHt h
H
)
(3.3.14)
NLt T
L
t+1 +N
H
t T
H
t+1 = (1− )Rτw
(
NLt h
L +NHt h
H
)
(3.3.15)
To determine the transfer payments received by a single agent of type H in t, we
need to divide the aggregate pension payments Bt+1 by the number of retired type
H agents:
BFt+1
NHt
= τw
HFt
NHt
R (3.3.16)
Using the characterizations of payment schemes given by (3.2.7) and (3.2.8) and
(3.3.15), we derive equilibrium pension payments under the two payment schemes
as:
Beveridge: TL
fF
t = T
HfF
t+1 = T
fF
t+1 = (1− )τwh¯fFt R (3.3.17)
Bismarck: T I
cF
t+1 = (1− )τwthIR for I = L,H. (3.3.18)
Obviously pension payments for a type L agent are higher under a Beveridge scheme
and for type H agents they are higher under a Bismarck scheme as hL < h¯fGt < h
H .
Plugging these pension payments into (3.2.6) and (3.3.4) we derive equilibrium birth
rates under an FF pension system with two different payment schemes:
Beveridge: nL
fF
t =
α
A
[1− τ + (1− )τ h¯
fF
t
hL
] (3.3.19)
nH
fF
t =
α
A
[1− τ + (1− )τ h¯
fF
t
hH
+ τ
HfFt
NH
fF
t h
H
] (3.3.20)
Bismarck: nL
cF
t =
α
A
[1− τ ] (3.3.21)
nH
cF
t =
α
A
[1− τ + τ H
cF
t
NH
cF
t h
H
]. (3.3.22)
Like under a PAYG system we can already see here that transfer payments increase
fertility of high-potential agents above the fertility of agents with low human capital
at least if a Bismarck scheme is prevailing. Type L agents always have less children
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through an increase of  whereas type H agents always have more children3. How
many more children they have depends either on the ratio of average human capital
to their own (Beveridge) or on the ratio of aggregate human capital of all agents
Ht to aggregate human capital of type H agents N
H
t h
H(Beveridge and Bismarck).
The less the difference between h¯t and h
H is the less redistribution through pension
payments occur altogether under Beveridge. A single type L agent receives the most
redistribution of income if h¯fFt is close to h
H . The larger the ratio of NLt to N
H
t is,
the less type H agents contribute to and benefit from the transfer payments and,
therefore, a single type H agent receives proportionally more.
3.3.3 Comparison of birth rates
The intention of introducing transfer payments for agents who are endowed with
high human capital was to stimulate their endogenous fertility. The aim was to
turn around the process of a decreasing average human capital. We now have to
prove whether it works or not. A success would be to slow down the process, i.e.
to draw the fertility rates of L and H agents nearer or even to increase the fertility
rate of type H agents above the one of type L agents. Such a transfer payment is
introduced in the initial period t = 0 when NL0 = N
H
0 . We saw before that under a
Bismarck scheme birth rates of both types of agents are equal if no transfer payments
exist. In the presence of transfer payments we see directly by comparing (3.3.12)
with (3.3.13) and (3.3.21) with (3.3.22) that high-skilled agents have more children
than low-skilled agents. Therefore, under a Bismarck payment scheme no matter
if a PAYG or an FF pension system prevails the introduction of transfer payments
leads to a higher average human capital. Hence, the production per capita increases
over time.
Over time a Beveridge scheme leads to a decreasing human capital per capita as long
as no transfer payments are active regardless of the pension system implemented. If
transfer payments are introduced, the relation of type L and type H agents’ birth
rates changes.
3The first derivative of birth rates with respect to the factor  is given as:
∂nL
fF
t
∂ < 0,
∂nL
cF
t
∂ < 0
and for type H agents:
∂nH
fF
t
∂ > 0,
∂nH
cF
t
∂ > 0
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Proposition 3.3.1. If transfer payments are implemented, birth rates of individuals
with high individual human capital (i.e. H-type agents) are higher than the birth rates
of individuals with low human capital under all four possible combinations of pension
systems and payment schemes if h
H−hL
hH
< . Under a Bismarck payment scheme this
is even true for all  ≥ 0. Hence, output per capita grows over time.
Proof. The evidence for a Bismarck payment scheme is proven by a comparison
of (3.3.12) with (3.3.13) and (3.3.21) with (3.3.22). To prove the evidence for a
Beveridge payment scheme we restrict the analysis to a PAYG pension system as
the proof works in the same way for an FF system. High-skilled agents have more
children in all periods t if the following equivalence relation holds:
nL
fG
t < n
HfG
t (3.3.23)
⇐⇒ N
HfG
t (h
H − hL)
NL
fG
t h
L +NH
fG
t h
H
<  (3.3.24)
Knowing that N It can be written as N
I
t = n
I
0n
I
1 · · ·nIt−1N I0 , we can rewrite the LHS
expression of (3.3.24) as
NH0 (h
H−hL)
NH0 h
H+
nL0 n
L
1 ···nLt−1
nH0 n
H
1 ···nHt−1
NL0 h
L
. As NL0 = N
H
0 under all pension sys-
tems and payment schemes we can simplify the former expression to h
H−hL
hH+
nL0 n
L
1 ···nLt−1
nH0 n
H
1 ···nHt−1
hL
.
This is smaller than h
H−hL
hH
. Therefore, if
hH − hL
hH +
nL0 n
L
1 ···nLt−1
nH0 n
H
1 ···nHt−1
hL
<
hH − hL
hH
< 
holds, nL
fG
t < n
HfG
t holds for all t.
This means that transfer payments for high-skilled agents lead to higher fertility
and, therefore, to higher output per capita. Hence, the government can increase
output per capita over time via stimulating fertility of high-skilled agents by giving
incentives in the form of transfer payments.
3.3.4 Welfare comparison with/without transfer payments
Transfer payments have been introduced with the aim of stimulating fertility. We
note in the previous section that birth rates of high-skilled agents are higher than
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those of low-skilled agents if the transfer rate is sufficiently high, i.e.  > h
H−hL
hH
.
Therefore, transfer payments suceeded and increased production per capita as well.
The remaining open question is whether such a transfer payment will lower or in-
crease individual welfare of the entire population or whether only a part of the
population gains and the other part loses through such a policy measurement. For
a statement we compare the life-time utility of all agents under the different pen-
sion systems and different payment schemes when there exists/does not exist such a
transfer payment as described above. We will proceed chronologically which means
we will first analyze a Beveridge and a Bismarck PAYG pension system and then
continue with Beveridge/Bismarck fully funded pension systems.
Low-skilled agents have to pay for the transfer payments without receiving any
compensation. In contrast, the net payment for transfer benefits is for high-skilled
agents negative, Hence, they receive a positive net payment. Since there is no direct
gain for type L agents, the question is whether they benefit indirectly from higher
pension payments or lose at all. For a welfare statement it is sufficient to compare
the single arguments of the utility function discretely as the utility function is mono-
tonically increasing as mentioned before.
Given a PAYG pension system with a Beveridge payment scheme we will compare
birth rates of type L agents when transfer payments are inactive/active as a first
step. In the following we will use the incidental notation: variables (n˜t, c˜t, c˜t+1) are
used under active transfer payments. We know that the average human capital under
a Beveridge payment scheme is monotonically decreasing and in the long run tends
to hL as long as no transfer payments are introduced. In case transfer payments are
introduced, average human capital monotonically increases over time if  > h
H−hL
hH
and tends to hH . Comparing the birth rates of low-skilled agents in an economy
without/with transfer payments we receive the following equivalence relation:
nL
fG
t < n˜
LfG
t
⇐⇒ h¯FGt < (1− )˜¯hFGt .
Initially, average human capital is the same, i.e. h¯FG0 =
˜¯hFG0 . While n
LfG
t is mono-
63
3. Endogenous Fertility and Welfare
tonically decreasing, n˜L
fG
t is monotonically increasing if  >
hH−hL
hH
. For n˜L
fG
t to be
larger than nL
fG
t in the long run the condition  <
hH−hL
hH
has to be fulfilled. But
this contradicts the condition for a monotonically increasing average human capital
under transfer payments. Following this result, low-skilled agents will in no period
have more children when they must pay for transfer payments than without such
payments.
The comparison of cL
fG
t,t < c˜
LfG
t and c
LfG
t+1,t < c˜
LfG
t+1 gives the same result. This means
that a type L agent cannot gain from transfer payments under a Beveridge PAYG
system as the losses through transfer payments are in no period outweighted by
higher pension payments due to higher birth rates of type H agents which leads to
a raising average human capital. In contrast, a high-skilled agent always gains from
transfer payments, which we will show below, as only he receives them.
nH
fG
t < n˜
HfG
t
⇐⇒ h¯fGt < ˜¯hfGt (1 + 
NLt
NHt
)
which is always fulfilled as long as  > (h
H−hL)
hH
as this condition leads to increas-
ing average human capital under transfer payments and we know that h¯FG0 =
˜¯hFG0
holds. The same argumentation is true for consumption in working/retirement pe-
riod. Hence, a type H agent receives higher welfare if transfer payments are ac-
tive. Using these results we conclude that high-skilled agents benefit from transfer
payments whereas low-skilled agents gain a lower welfare if transfer payments are
introduced under a Beveridge PAYG system.
Next we consider a Bismarck PAYG pension system. Under such a system pension
payments are contribution related, therefore, pension payments of a type L agent
depend on how much he contributed to the system. Here he does not benefit from
higher contributions of type H agents and, therefore, not from a raising average
human capital. Therefore, our conjecture is that under a Bismarck PAYG a type L
agent suffers and a type H agent gains from transfer payments. The comparison of
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birth rates of type L agents leads to:
nL
cG
t > n˜
LcG
t
⇐⇒ AR > AR− ατ
which holds in all periods t ≥ 0. The same argument is true for consumption in
the periods of working and retirement. Under this system a type H agent receives
an additional payment without any net costs for himself. Therefore, it increases his
welfare/life-time utility.
nH
cG
t < n˜
HcG
t
⇐⇒ 0 < ατ h
LNLt
hHNHt
which holds true for all periods t ≥ 0. The same argumentation is used to prove
cH
cG
t,t < c˜
HcG
t and c
HcG
t+1,t < c˜
HcG
t+1 . We see that under a Bismarck PAYG system not
all types of agents gain from transfer payments. More precisely, high-skilled agents
benefit in every period whereas low-skilled agents suffer from lower welfare in case
transfer payments are introduced.
The same comparison can be done for the two payment schemes under a fully funded
pension system and we gain the same result: Low-skilled agents suffer whereas high-
skilled agents gain from transfer payments.
Theorem 3.3.2. Transfer payments introduced with the intention to increase aver-
age human capital/output per capita do have opposed side effects. While high-skilled
agents benefit from transfer payments in terms of higher life-time utility low skilled
agents gain lower welfare compared to an economy whithout such transfer payments.
Proof. For the proof see above.
In the long run the fraction of low-skilled agents in the economy tends to zero,
meaning that almost no transfer payments are payed to high-skilled agents. Under
a Beveridge payment scheme high-skilled agents benefit nevertheless as they receive
almost the same pension payments as under a contribution related payment scheme
(Bismarck). If a Bismarck payment scheme is prevailing, the positive effects of
transfer payments for high-skilled agents vanish in the long run – their pension
payments are already contribution related and transfer payments tend to be zero.
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3.4 Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed how fertility is influenced by pension systems and by the
type of agents. The model shows that agents who are higher skilled, i.e. endowed
with higher human capital, have less children than low-skilled agents as long as
there are no active transfer payments. This is something we observe in real data
as well. The media often reports that people with an academic background have
less children than workers with a low level of education. We showed that giving
incentives in the form of transfer payments leads to an increase of the fertility of
high-skilled agents and that they have even more children than low-skilled agents
under certain conditions. This leads to an increasing average human capital and,
therefore, to an increasing output per capita over time. Governments are hardly
able to observe individual life-time utility. But they can quantify production per
capita and use this statistic as an indicator for welfare. In this respect, transfer
payments increase welfare. In contrast, measuring the individual life-time utility
shows that low-skilled agents suffer and high-skilled agents benefit from transfer
payments. Using the results from the comparison of birth rates raises the conjecture
that in the long run only high-skilled agents are alive. This leads in our model
to the highest possible average human capital and, therefore, output per capita.
Leading to the conclusion that an economy whose population is high-skilled and
where few inequalities (differences between high- and low-skilled agents) exist, has
a high economic output.
A negative proportional transfer payment as it is discussed in Germany in the form
of “Kindergeld” is supposed to lower fertility of high-skilled agents and, therefore,
aggregate welfare of the economy. This would contradict our aim of introducing
transfer payments.
We did not investigate an endogenous decision for learning which would probably
change the model. The model was simplified by the assumption of fixed individual
human capital and bequest rules of human capital. To introduce a random process
of human capital at the time of birth and a learning process is a possible extension
of the model. Such a learning process would endogenously change the mixture of
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low/medium/high skilled agents in the population. This would of course influence
our results on welfare.
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Chapter 4
How do Pension Systems Influence
Decisions on Education?
Abstract: This chapter asks how different pension systems influence the decision
by parents for investing in the education of their own children if inter-generational
altruism is concidered. In this model human capital is built according to a human
capital formation rule. Parents can influence the human capital of their children by
investing in education. We show that investments in education are different under
the two predominant pension systems (pay-as-you-go and fully funded) and that
a PAYG pension system leads to higher human capital under certain conditions.
The analysis shows that heterogenous agents (same preferences but different human
capital endowment) make different educational investment decisions. This leads to
the fact that children of less educated parents do not have the chance to close the
gap to the better educated agents. We analyze whether a PAYG system leads to
higher inequality concerning the human capital allocation in a small open country
and whether higher economic output goes hand in hand with higher inequality.
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4.1 Introduction
Pension payments are the major income of individuals when retired. Most western
industrialized countries implemented a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system at a
time when individuals did not often become much older than the retirement age
and birth rates were quite high. A PAYG pension system is based on a contract
between generations: children pay pensions for the parental generation. Nowadays
life expectancy has dramatically increased and birth rates have decreased. Retirees
receive pension payments for a longer period (age at entry constant) which are fi-
nanced by less contributors. Although France and Germany recently increased the
age of entry to retirement, this uprating does not reflect the increase in the life
span observable in both countries1. Therefore, such a PAYG system faces financing
problems in order to guarantee suitable pension payments. It is often discussed to
switch from a PAYG to a fully funded (FF) pension system. Besides the techni-
cal problems of such a switch (generations who already contribute will not receive
pension payments and have to pay double to ensure old-age consumption) it is not
clear if an FF system is the dominant one with respect to welfare. Many papers
in the existing literature show that an FF system leads to higher economic growth
while the effects on welfare are not clear. The intention of this paper is to clearify
whether an FF system is “better” in terms of welfare in general or whether a PAYG
system is the dominant one under certain conditions. We do not consider how a
switch from one system to the other can be solved. This should be done in a next
step if an FF system is verified to be the dominant one.
Using an OLG-model with homogenous agents living for three periods we present an
equilibrium model of a small open economy with inter-generational altruism. The
small-open economy assumption neglects effects arising through human capital for-
mation on the capital market but allows us to clearify the effects of different pension
systems on investments in education and welfare in a simple framework. This paper
analyzes how different pension systems influence human capital formation of agents.
1When Bismarck introduced the public pension system in Germany in 1889 the average expected
lifespan was 40 years and in 2010 it was 80 years.
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Agents decide whether and how much (we exclude credit constraints) to invest in
the education process of their children. The aim is to show that agents behave
differently (concerning education expenditures) under the two different pension sys-
tems. Further, we show that a PAYG pension system leads to higher human capital
formation and higher economic output than an FF system under certain conditions.
The common opinion2 is that an FF pension system leads to higher economic growth
(through higher physical capital accumulation). We try to figure out whether this
holds in general or whether certain conditions exist under which a PAYG system
leads to higher economic growth. We introduce in a next step two different families
of agents who are homogenous within the family but heterogenous concerning their
human capital endowment between the families. Regarding their preferences and
their ability parameter the agents of the two families do not differ. The influence
of the pension systems is different on the two families. It is shown that the familiy
which is initially wealthier (higher human capital leads to higher wage income) will
remain the wealthier familiy over time. We analyze under which pension system the
inequality concerning the allocation of human capital within a generation is larger
and whether higher economic output goes hand in hand with higher inequality or
not. The model shows that under certain conditions there exists a positive link
between inequality and economic output. In contrast, Galor and Zeira (1993) show
that higher inequality goes hand in hand with lower economic output. The main
difference to our paper is the existence of imperfect credit markets, bequests and
the existence of two different production functions which either employ unskilled
or skilled labor. Agents decide whether to invest in education or not. If they are
initially rich (due to positive bequests of parents), they are more likely to invest in
education than agents who are initially poor. Poor agents need to take credits for ed-
ucation investments. If these credits are too expensive, they decide to stay unskilled
and work in the unskilled production sector. Therefore, rich agents stay rich and
poor remain poor while the inequality is raising. Our paper does not compare the
two different pension systems in a steady state analysis but pointwise in each period.
2See for example Kaganovich and Zilcha (2012)
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4.2 The benchmark model
An overlapping generations model (OLG) with a lifespan of three periods for each
individual is considered. Like Kaganovich and Meier (2008) we restrict our analysis
to a small open economy where perfectly competitive firms (or a single representative
firm) produce a single homogenous good. This good can be used for consumption and
investment purposes. The production process is given by an aggregate production
function F (K,H). Input factors to their constant returns neoclassical production
technology are human H and physical capital K. The latter fully depreciates in ev-
ery period. Due to the small open economy the interest rate rt is given exogenously.
For simplicity, the rate of return Rt = 1 + rt on physical capital is assumed to be
constant over time. Using a constant returns technology with a fixed interest rate
the wage rate w per human capital is constant over time as well. This model treats
physical capital as a mobile input factor whereas human capital is immobile.
The three periods of each individual are indentified as childhood, adulthood and
retirement. In the period of childhood individuals do not make any decisions about
consumption, education or savings. Concerning their life-time utility this period can
be neglected. The important period is adulthood. In this period each individual
supplies inelastically one unit of labor and receives wage income according to his
individual human capital w h. Hence individual human capital h stands for effec-
tive labor supply. Decisions on having children, investing in education of children,
consumption and savings are made in this period by adult agents. Having children
is an asexual process in this model, i.e. each agent has only one parent. In the third
period, the retirement period, individuals do not work anymore and, therefore, do
not receive any wage income. Thus, old-age consumption has to be financed by
returns on savings and pension payments. Bequest motives are completly neglected
so that pensioners consume their entire income. Each generation will be indexed
with its birth period t− 1, so an agent of generation t− 1 was born in t− 1, will be
working in t and will be retired in t+ 1.
In the benchmark model we consider homogenous agents, i.e. they do not differ
regarding their preferences and their human capital endowment. Their preferences
are described by an additively separable utility function, which is given for an agent
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of generation t− 1 (born in period t− 1) in the following way:
U(ct,t−1, ct+1,t−1, ht) = α ln ct,t−1 + β ln ct+1,t−1 + θ ln ntht. (4.2.1)
ct,t−1 denotes consumption of an adult agent in t who was born in t − 1. ct+1,t−1
denotes his consumption when retired, ht denotes the human capital of his children
and nt shows how many children he has. In this model the population stays con-
stant over time, i.e. the number of children per agent is set to one nt = 1. Obviously
individuals have not only preferences for their own consumption when adult respec-
tively when retired but they also care about the human capital of their children.
This expresses parents’ altruism towards their offsprings. This is due to the positive
correlation between human capital and wage income and through this consumption
(of children) is increased by higher human capital. Under a PAYG pension system
future human capital has also an indirect effect on the utility as it influences pension
payments positively. The human capital formation is given in the following way:
ht = BEt (4.2.2)
where Et is the amount a single parent spends on the education of its children
and B is an ability factor with B > 0. In our model human capital formation is
purely driven by the parental education investment. This illustrates that parents
can influence the human capital of their children by investing more or less in the
education of their children. Their total expenditures on education need to be divided
by the number of children but, as we assume a constant population, it is redundant
in this model. Consumption in the adult period t is limited by the following budget
restriction:
ct,t−1 = (1− τ)wht−1 − st − Et (4.2.3)
where 0 < τ < 1 is the contribution rate to the pension system determined by the
government and fixed over time. Consumption in the retirement period is deter-
mined by
ct+1,t−1 = Rst + Tt+1 (4.2.4)
where Tt+1 is the pension payment an individual born in period t− 1 receives when
retired in period t + 1. Agents in this model are assumed to be rational utility
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maximizer. Hence, their objective function is given by
max
Et≥0,st,ct,t−1,ct+1,t−1
U(·) = max
Et≥0,st,ct,t−1,ct+1,t−1
(α ln ct,t−1 + β ln ct+1,t−1 + θ ln ht)
(4.2.5)
with respect to the human capital formation (4.2.2) and the two budget constraints
(4.2.3) and (4.2.4). In a general setting without distinguishing yet between the two
different pension systems and taking R and w as given we derive their decision rules
for savings and education investments in the following way:
st =
1
P
[
1
α + β
(1− τ)[θ(1− τ)wht−1 − (αP )− θ)Tt+1
R
]− δ
B
ht−1
]
(4.2.6)
Et =
θ
P
[
Tt+1
R
+ (1− τ)wht−1
]
(4.2.7)
with P := α + β + θ. While the savings decision can take negative values, which
would indicate credit taking, the education expenditures Et are restricted to positive
numbers, i.e. Et ≥ 0 for all periods t ≥ 0.
4.2.1 Decisions under PAYG
The PAYG pension system is the predominant system in most western economies. It
is characterized by a reallocation of wage income between generations. Young work-
ing consumers are forced by the government to release a part of their wage income
(contributions) to the pension system. The PAYG system collects the contributions
but does not invest them in the production function. Instead it gives it directly to
the old-age pensioners (beneciaries). Hence, it implements a pure reallocation of
wage income from young to old adults. We indicate variables belonging to the two
different pension systems by a superscript G for PAYG and by a superscript F for
FF pension system. We drop the superscripts whenever it is possible. In equilib-
rium the aggregate amount of pension payments must equal aggregate contributions.
As the adult generation pays for the retired generation, the budget constraint of a
PAYG pension system is described by: Aggregate pension payments have to equal
the aggregate contributions in the same period.
NTt+1 = τwhtN (4.2.8)
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A PAYG pension system is introduced in t = 0 in such a way that agents, born in
t = 0, are the first agents who contribute to the pension system in t = 1 while adult.
Agents who are adult in t = 0 receive benefits in t = 1 without having contributed
themselfes to the pension system. Agents who are retired in t = 0 do not receive
any benefits out of the PAYG pension system.
Definition 4.2.1. Given the stock of agents N and the exogenously given and fixed
rate of return R, a dynamic competitive equilibrium (DCE) is a sequence of indi-
vidual agent’s decisions {Et, st, ct,t−1, ct+1,t−1}∞t=0, individual levels of human capital
{ht}∞t=0, factor prices of labor {wt}∞t=0 and a sequence of pension payments {Tt+1}∞t=0
so that:
• For each period t = 0, 1, . . . , the collection of Et, st, ct,t−1, ct+1,t−1 solves the
individual household’s problem (4.2.2)– (4.2.5) where factor prices w,R and
future pension payments Tt+1 are taken as given.
• Factor markets clear. Factor markets are competitive, hence according to
the economy’s production function the factor prices are determined by their
marginal products.
Rt = FK(
Kt
Ht
, 1)
wt = FH(
Kt
Ht
, 1)
• Individual pension payments received by generation t retirees satisfy (4.2.8).
Due to the small open economy assumption R is exogenously given and for simplic-
ity fixed. The constant returns neoclassical production technology in combination
with R constant leads to a constant wage rate w.
If the human capital formation rule (4.2.2) and equation (4.2.7) are considered,
equilibrium pension payments are given by
Tt+1 = τwht
θR
PR− τwθBB(1− τ)w (4.2.9)
A PAYG pension system should provide retirees with positive pension payments.
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Assumption 4.2.2. R
w
> τBθ
α+β+θ
This assumption holds troughout the entire model and guarantees positive pension
payments. It is fulfilled for τ sufficiently small and the factors revealing preferences
for own consumption while adult and while retired are sufficiently large. If the
altruism towards children is too large and the contribution rates too high, parents
would accept negative pension benefits to ensure their children a higher wealth.
Negative pension benefits mean that retired agents pay for the adult agents. Human
capital of the children depends positively on the parental human capital. Through
this pension payments depend positively on the retiree’s own human capital.
If we plug the equilibrium pension payment (4.2.9) under PAYG into (4.2.7), we see:
Et =
θ
P
[
θ
PR− τwθBτwht−1B(1− τ)w + (1− τ)wht−1
]
. (4.2.10)
The education expenditures are the higher the higher the altruism of parents towards
their children is. If parents do not care about children’s utility, they do not invest
in the education at all. Although this would mean that they do not receive any
pension benefits out of the PAYG pension system.
4.2.2 Decision under FF
The mechanism of a fully funded public pension system is completly different than
the PAYG system. Contributions to the pension system of working agents are
collected and invested in the production technology for one period. Therefore, agents
receive the return on their own contributions one period ahead in the form of pension
payments. Hence, this system shows no reallocation effects between two consecutive
generations and because of the Bismarck payment scheme (pension benefits are
payed according to own contributions) also no intra generational redistribution. As
there exists only one production technology, private savings and contributions to the
pension system are perfect substitutes since they earn the same return3. Pension
3In this model we neglect any tax benefits or allowances, which a government often provides to
FF pension systems.
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payments under an FF system have the following structure:
Tt+1 = Rτwht−1. (4.2.11)
Using (4.2.7) and (4.2.11), the equilibrium education expenditures are:
Et =
θ
P
wht−1. (4.2.12)
Although under FF agents do not receive pension benefits which are financed by
their children, they invest in the education of their children as long as they care for
children’s utility. Hence, as long as altruism towards children is active.
4.2.3 Comparison of Welfare under PAYG and FF
In this section we will compare the welfare a single agent achieves under the two
possible pension systems. Welfare of a single agent is defined as his life-time utility
in this model. The utility function is monotonically increasing in all three arguments
ct,t−1, ct+1,t−1, ht, therefore, it is sufficient to compare them separately (we will see
that if one argument is larger under one pension system the others are larger under
the same system as well).
We set t = 1 as the initial period. In this initial period the human capital of
adult agents (born in t − 1 = 0) is identical under both pension systems. Hence,
hGt−1 = h
G
0 = h
F
0 = h
F
t−1 holds. The human capital of children can already differ
under the two system in t = 1.
We will now compare the three arguments of the utility function separately to an-
alyze which system provides higher welfare. First we compare the human capital
of agents in any period t and question whether it is smaller under an FF pension
system.
hGt > h
F
t
⇐⇒ BEGt > BEFt
Proposition 4.2.3. In our small open economy a PAYG pension system leads to
higher individual human capital than an FF system in any period t ≥ 1 if τθB
P
<
R
w
< θB
P
holds.
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Proof. For higher individual human capital under PAYG than under FF in every
period t ≥ 1 the following must hold:
B
θ
P
whFt−1 < B
θ
P
[
θ
PR− τwθBτwh
G
t−1B(1− τ)w + (1− τ)whGt−1]
⇐⇒ hFt−1 − hGt−1 < τhGt−1[
θ
PR− τwθBB(1− τ)w − 1]
Start with t = 1: we know hF0 = h
G
0 . Hence, for h
G
1 > h
F
1 the following must hold:
0 < τhG0 [
θ
PR− τwθBB(1− τ)w − 1]
This holds for R
w
< θB
P
. In t = 2 human capital is higher under PAYG if
hF1 − hG1 < τhG1 [
θ
PR− τwθBB(1− τ)w − 1]
holds. The RHS is positive if R
w
< θB
P
and the LHS is negative as shown before.
Therefore, hG2 > h
F
2 .
We conclude: Individual human capital is under PAYG higher than under FF for
all periods t ≥ 1 if τθB
P
< R
w
< θB
P
.
Assumption 4.2.4. τθB
P
< R
w
< θB
P
In a small open economy higher individual human capital has no influence on the
factor prices R and w. While under a PAYG pension system agents benefit from
higher human capital of their children via higher pension benefits, agents do not
receive higher pension benefits under an FF system as benefits only depend on their
own contributions. Preferences for the consumption of children, i.e. for human cap-
ital of children, are the same under both systems, hence, they do not explain the
differences of the human capital under different systems. Kaganovich and Zilcha
(2012) show that an FF system leads always to a higher human capital in a closed
economy. They explain this by the fact that education expenditures have no direct
positive effect on the present value of pension benefits under PAYG. Since our model
uses a small open economy, physical and human capital accumulation have no effect
on the wage rate and the rate of return. Therefore, education expenditures have a
positive effect on pension benefits in our framework.
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Many papers treating the growth effect of pension systems claim that an FF sys-
tem leads to higher economic output due to higher physical capital accumulation
in a closed economy. The considered economy in this model is a small open one
with mobile physical capital but immobile human capital. Due to perfect physical
capital mobility, a neoclassic production technology with constant returns and a
constant rate of return, physical capital will be supplied in equilibrium in a con-
stant proportion to human capital. This implies that aggregate output grows at the
same rate as the human capital accumulation. Since the size of the population stays
constant in this model, individual human capital is decisive. Considering a popula-
tion with homogenous agents, we showed above that a PAYG pension system leads
to higher education expenditures under certain conditions, i.e. Assumption 4.2.4.
These higher education expenditures lead to higher human capital and, therefore,
to higher economic output.
Consumption in adulthood and old-age retirement are given under both pension
systems in the following way.
cFt,t−1 =
α
P
whFt−1
cGt,t−1 =
α
P
[(1− τ)whGt−1 +
θ
PR− τwθBτwh
G
t−1B(1− τ)w]
cFt+1,t−1 =
β
P
RwhFt−1
cGt+1,t−1 =
β
P
R[(1− τ)whGt−1 +
θ
PR− τwθBτwh
G
t−1B(1− τ)w]
Proposition 4.2.5. In our small open economy, a PAYG pension system leads to
higher human capital and to higher welfare of the agents as well under Assumption
4.2.4.
Proof. Consumption of an adult agent in period t is higher under PAYG than under
FF if the following is fulfilled:
α
P
whFt−1 <
α
P
[(1− τ)whGt−1 +
θ
PR− τwθBτwh
G
t−1B(1− τ)w] (4.2.13)
⇐⇒ hFt−1 − hGt−1 < τhGt−1[
θ
PR− τwθBB(1− τ)w − 1] (4.2.14)
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Using the proof of proposition 4.2.3 we can claim that agent’s consumption in adult-
hood is higher under PAYG than under FF under Assumption 4.2.4 The same is
true for consumption in the retirement period.
This comparison does not include agents who are adult or retired in t = 0. Agents,
adult in t = 0 would benefit from the implementation of a PAYG system as they
would receive pension benefits without contributing self. Whereas under an FF
system they do not receive free pension benefits. Further, we compare only the
welfare of one generation and not the aggregate welfare of all agents (adult and
retired) under different systems. Under Assumption 4.2.4 agents are endowed with
higher human capital under a PAYG pension system and they also receive higher
pension payments than under an FF system in every period t ≥ 1. This enables them
to save less for future consumption during their working period and to consume more
while adult. Although their return on savings is smaller than under an FF system
they consume more since the higher pension benefit is able to overcompensate this
“loss”.
4.3 Dynasties of heterogenous agents
In this section we distinguish between two dynasties of families. One is indicated
by the superscript L and the other by the superscript H. An agent, whose parent
belonges to the L family, will belong to this family as well. Therefore, we distinguish
between two types of agents: type L and type H where the types only signalize their
affiliation to one family. The agents belonging to one familiy are all homogenous
and are endowed with the same amount of human capital. We assume that the
preferences and the “learning” ability of the agents, indicated by the parameter B,
are the same no matter to which family the agents belong. In the initial period
t = 1 agents, born in t − 1 = 0, of the two families differ regarding their human
capital endowment. Initially, agents of type L are per assumption endowed with less
human capital than agents of type H so that hL0 < h
H
0 holds. The human capital
production function is the same as in the benchmark model.
hIt = BE
I
t (4.3.1)
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with I = {L,H}.
In equilibrium the aggregate amount of pension payments for the retirees must equal
the total budget of the pension system, i.e. under PAYG the aggregate amount
of (new) adult agents’ contributions and under FF the return on own aggregate
contributions. The number of agents belonging to family L is given by NL and
the number of agents belonging to family H by NH . The sizes of the families are
not necessarily equal but as we exclude population growth in this model they are
constant over time. The budget constraints of the two pension systems are given in
the following way:
PAYG : NLTLt+1 +N
HTHt+1 = τw[N
LhLt +N
HhHt ] (4.3.2)
FF : NLTLt+1 +N
HTHt+1 = Rτw[N
LhLt−1 +N
HhHt−1] (4.3.3)
Both pension systems adopt in this model a Bismarck payment scheme. Under
such a scheme, retirees receive pension benefits which are proportional to their own
contributions, i.e. THt+1 =
hHt−1
hLt−1
TLt+1. Using (4.2.7) and (4.3.2), we receive the pension
benefits of an agent under PAYG in the following way:
T It+1 =
θ
PR− τwθBτwh
I
t−1RB(1− τ)w (4.3.4)
with I = L,H and under an FF system pension payments are determined as:
T It+1 = Rτwh
I
t−1. (4.3.5)
Using (4.3.4) and (4.3.5) and plugging them into (4.2.7) we derive the education
expenditures under PAYG and under FF.
PAYG : EIt =
θ
P
(1− τ)whIt−1
[
θ
PR− τwθBτBw + 1
]
(4.3.6)
FF : EIt =
θ
P
whIt−1 (4.3.7)
Equation (4.3.6) shows that educational expenditures are increasing in the individual
human capital. From this and from the fact that in the initial period the relation
hL0 < h
H
0 holds, we conclude that agents, belonging to family H, are better educated
as type L agents in every period t ≥ 0 as long as altruism towards children is active.
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The same is true under an FF pension system, see (4.3.7). Hence, under both pension
systems agents belonging to familiy H are in every period t ≥ 0 endowed with higher
individual human capital than the agents of family L. Equation (4.3.6) and (4.3.7)
show as well that the education expenditures are decreasing in the factors α and β
which weight the preferences for own consumption when young and old (remember:
P := α + β + θ).
4.3.1 Inequality and Growth
Galor and Zeira (1993) show that in a small open economy with credit market im-
perfections inequality regarding human capital allocation harms economic growth.
More recently Berg and Ostry (2011) use panel data to show that economies, featur-
ing a more equal allocation of wealth throughout the population, grow faster. This
is not necessarily true in our model.
In this section we analyze whether higher inequality (under one pension system) and
higher economic growth (under the same system) go hand in hand. The difference
in individual human capital endowment is used as an expression for inequality. In-
equality occuring in an economy in period t is defined as IEt = |hHt −hLt | = hHt −hLt
as we saw that individual human capital is always higher in family H. IEt measures
the inequality between young agents, i.e. children in period t. In period t−1 = 0 the
inequality among the initial generation is the same under both pension systems as
the initial human capital endowment is the same. Comparing the inequality under
both pension systems over time leads to the following result.
Theorem 4.3.1. A PAYG pension system leads to higher inequality if Assumption
4.2.4 holds.
Proof. Comparing inequality under both systems leads to the following equivalence
relation4:
4Using (4.3.4) and (4.3.6) (respectivally (4.3.5) and(4.3.7)) and plugging them into the human
capital formation rule (4.3.1) gives the human capital in every period t. Using this to determine
the inequality leads to the fact that inequality in period t depends on human capital of period
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IEFt < IE
G
t
⇐⇒ (hHFt−1 − hL
F
t−1) < (1− τ)(hH
G
t−1 − hL
G
t−1)[
θ
PR− τwθBτwB + 1]
⇐⇒ (h
HF
t−1 − hLFt−1)
(hH
G
t−1 − hLGt−1)
< (1− τ)[ θ
PR− τwθBτwB + 1]
Start with t = 1: We know hH
F
0 − hLF0 = hHG0 − hLG0 . Therefore, the comparison
reduces to
(hH
F
0 − hLF0 )
(hH
G
0 − hLG0 )
= 1 < (1− τ)[ θ
PR− τwθBτwB + 1]
which is fulfilled for R
w
< θB
P
. This holds due to Assumption 4.2.4. Therefore,
IEF1 < IE
G
1 holds. Using this result we can easily confirm that IE
F
t < IE
G
t holds
for every period t ≥ 1.
Obviously, the same assumption, which leads to higher human capital under PAYG
in the benchmark model leads to higher inequality under PAYG if heterogenous
agents exist. Human capital of both types of agents grow with the same rate5. As
this growth rate is higher under PAYG than under FF, the gap between the human
capital endowment of the two families will be higher under PAYG than under FF
for all t ≥ 1.
t− 1.
IEGt = B
θ
P
(hH
G
t−1 − hL
G
t−1)(1− τ)w[
θ
PR− τwθB τwB + 1]
IEFt = B
θ
P
w(hH
F
t−1 − hL
F
t−1)
5
Under PAYG: gG :=
θ
P
(1− τ)w
[
θ
PR− τwθB τBw + 1
]
and under FF: gF :=
θ
P
w
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In the previous section we mentioned that in equilibrium physical and human capital
are used in a fixed relation for production. Therefore, to determine the economic
output it is sufficient to know the aggregate human capital. For a comparison
of economic output, used as an indicator for economic strength, it is sufficient to
compare aggregate human capital.
Proposition 4.3.2. Under Assumption 4.2.4 a PAYG pension system leads to
higher aggregate human capital and through this to higher economic output.
Proof. Comparing the aggregate human capital leads to the following equivalence
relation:
HFt < H
G
t
⇐⇒ NLhLFt +NHhH
F
t < N
LhL
G
t +N
HhH
G
t
⇐⇒ NL(hLFt − hL
G
t ) < N
H(hH
G
t − hH
F
t )
If we can show that the LHS is for all t negative and the RHS is for all t positive,
it proves that under PAYG the economic output is higher in every period. First,
we start with a comparison of hL
G
t and h
LF
t and receive the following equivalence
relation.
hL
F
t − hL
G
t < 0
⇐⇒ hLFt−1 − hL
G
t−1 < τh
LG
t−1[
θ
PR− τwθBB(1− τ)w − 1]
Starting with t = 1 the comparison reduces to
0 < τhL
G
0 [
θ
PR− τwθBB(1− τ)w − 1].
This holds for R
w
< θB
P
, which is fulfilled due to Assumption 4.2.4. In t = 2 the
comparison of hL
F
t and h
LG
t is given as
hL
F
1 − hL
G
1 < τh
LG
1 [
θ
PR− τwθBB(1− τ)w − 1]
The LHS is negative, as shown before, whereas the RHS is positive. Hence, hL
F
2 <
hL
G
2 holds. From this we can conclude that h
LF
t < h
LG
t holds for all periods t ≥ 1.
The same formalism can be used to prove hH
F
t < h
HG
t . Combining these two results
it is proven that HFt < H
G
t holds for all periods t ≥ 1.
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This shows that in our framework higher inequality goes hand in hand with higher
economic output/strength. Both types of agents have higher human capital under
PAYG than under FF as long as Assumption 4.2.4 holds. This is due to higher
education expenditures. The stronger growth of human capital leads to higher
economic output.
4.3.2 Welfare Comparison
We already saw in the last section that human capital of L and H type agents is
higher under a PAYG pension system if τθB
P
< R
w
< τθB
P
(Assumption 4.2.4). The
welfare comparison in the benchmark model shows that the pension system which
leads to higher individual human capital leads to higher consumption when adult
and retired. The same is true if two different families are introduced.
Proposition 4.3.3. A PAYG pension system leads to higher welfare of agents be-
longing to both families than an FF system if Assumption 4.2.4 holds.
Proof. For a proof see before.
4.4 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to analyze whether an FF pension system is in all aspects
(economic growth and welfare) the dominant system in general or whether a PAYG
system leads to higher welfare under certain conditions. We were able to prove, that
a PAYG system leads to higher welfare and to higher human capital and through this
to higher economic output, as we assume a small open economy, if certain conditions
regarding the preferences and the contribution rate are fulfilled. This shows, that
neither an FF nor a PAYG pension system is in general the dominant system and
that the dominance of one system depends on the given parameters. If a government
wants to decide which pension system is the right one for a certain economy in
terms of welfare and economic growth, the given parameterization has to be taken
into account. Heterogenous agents (regarding their human capital endowment) make
varying decisions with respect to their investments in the education of their children.
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We were able to show that agents with higher human capital invest always more than
agents with lower human capital. Meaning that the allocation of human capital will
never be homogeneous. If the intention is to close the gap between low and high-
skilled agents, education of low-skilled agents must be selectively assisted. This could
be done in the form of education vouchers. Nevertheless, experience in Germany
shows that they are quite often not demanded. Hence, education has to be made
mandatory for the group with low human capital endowment. We analyzed under
which system inequality regarding the human capital allocation is higher and showed
that, depending on the parameterization, higher inequality goes hand in hand with
higher economic output. This is possible in reality as well as the example of China
shows. Fast economic growth is possible although inequality within the population
is high and is increased through growth even further. In our model, using a small
open economy, it is possible to draw conclusions from economic strength to welfare.
It is shown, that the pension system which causes higher economic output leads to
higher welfare of all types of agents as well.
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Conclusion
This work was concerned with the question whether higher economic growth im-
plicates higher welfare for all agents. Chaper 2 showed that under an FF pension
system production output is higher due to a higher physical capital accumulation
(aggregate human capital is the same under both systems). In our framework of a
closed economy the crucial factor is the capital intensity factor. This factor deter-
mines whether welfare is higher under one system or under the other. This suggests
that different economies, which vary in their capital intensity, benefit in terms of
welfare from distinguished pension systems although an FF system always generates
higher economic output. In chapter 3 and 4 we used a small open economy which
neglects effects of human and physical capital accumulation on the factor prices.
Both chapters showed a positive relation of economic output and welfare but FF led
in this framework not necessarily to higher output. Chapter 3 also pointed out that
an increase in production output (through an increase in average human capital)
does not inevitable enhance welfare of all heterogeneous agents. This makes clear
that economic output per capita can be used as an indicator for welfare which is
easily evaluable but it gives not necessarily the true impression.
We figured out the relation between implemented pension systems and decisions for
children and for investments in their education as well. Depending on the given
economic parameters and the preferences of the agents both systems may lead to a
larger number of children and to higher investments in the education of children. In
the introduction we posed the question whether incentives, given in form of transfer
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payments, increase the fertility of high-skilled agents and through this the economic
output per capita. Such transfer payments worked in our framework (described in
chapter 3) in the intended way. They raised fertility and, therefore, average human
capital which induced higher economic output per capita. However, only the high-
skilled agents experienced a welfare increase while the low-skilled agents suffered
from such transfer payments.
Also, we shed light on the question whether higher inequality (in terms of human
capital endowment of agents) goes hand in hand with higher economic output. We
carved out a positive link between these two measurements, which is confirmed by
real world data as well, e.g. the Chinese economy.
Although we analyzed the effects of pension systems on different stylized facts, we
are not able to approve the dominance of one system in general. Depending on the
given economic parameters the government should decide whether a switch from
PAYG to FF is economically reasonable. Nevertheless, the yet open question is how
such a switch could be realized. In the introduction we have already pointed out
that the transition generation has to be compensated. This is a tough challenge and
not solved yet. Hence, further research on this aspect would be reasonable.
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